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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S JOINT CUSTODY
PRESUMPTION: MISPLACED BLAME AND
SIMPLISTIC SOLUTIONS
Margaret Martin Barry*
Joint custody made its statutory debut in 1979 with the passage of Cali-
fornia's Family Law Act.' Today, most states acknowledge joint custody
as an option. Several jurisdictions, however, have significantly limited the
applicability of joint custody, while only eight have made it presumptive.'
* The author is an Assistant Professor at the Columbus School of Law at The Catho-
lic University of America, where she teaches the Families and the Law Clinic. Many of the
statements found in this Article arise from her experience. The author would like to give
special thanks to Professors Karen Czapanskiy and Naomi R. Cahn for taking the time to
review the article and offer insightful comments. She also would like to thank her research
assistant, Nancy Palermo, for her reliable and skilled research in the preparation of this
article.
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (Deering 1984).
2. The eight jurisdictions that have a presumption or preference in favor of joint cus-
tody are Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana and New
Mexico. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-717B(4) (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1995); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:335(A)(1) (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2)(d) (West
Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(4) (1972 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-
4-224(1) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(A) (Michie 1994).
The courts in Florida have limited significantly the application of the statute. See Garvie
v. Garvie, 659 So. 2d 394, 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Bienvenu and Langford);
Langford v. Ortiz, 654 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("Rotating custody ... is
presumptively not in the best interest of a child."); Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d 1164,
1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (referring to the well-settled Florida law that divided cus-
tody arrangements are not to be sustained).
In determining whether to award sole or joint custody, the Montana Supreme Court has
ignored the statutory presumption and applied the best interests of the child standard to
the facts of each case. See generally Dale R. Mrkich, Comment, The Unfulfilled Promise of
Joint Custody in Montana, 48 MONT. L. REv. 135 (1987) (discussing Montana's joint cus-
tody law and the Montana Supreme Court's application of it).
California, the first jurisdiction to create a joint custody presumption, has since amended
its law to apply only in cases where the parents have agreed to joint custody. See CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3080 (1994). Connecticut, Maine, Michigan, Nevada and New Hampshire
have similar provisions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(b) (West 1995); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214(6) (West Supp. 1996); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a(2)
(West 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.490(1) (Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:17(11) (1992); see also Appendix A (providing a state-by-state analysis of joint cus-
tody statutes).
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In 1996, the District of Columbia joined the small minority when it en-
acted a presumption in favor of joint custody. In so doing, the District
entered into a realm of domestic relations law that has been described as
frightfully lacking in linguistic uniformity3 and consistency in outcome.4
This Article discusses the District of Columbia's version of joint cus-
tody. Section I provides a brief overview of child custody trends in the
United States. Section II considers the meaning of the term "joint cus-
tody" and the phrase "rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the
best interest of the child." Section III is an in-depth discussion of the
District of Columbia's new joint custody law. Section IV discusses the
incongruities between the concept of joint custody as advocated and the
realities of a predominantly black community in which poverty defines
the lives of a significant segment of the population. In particular, this
section questions the benefit to the District of Columbia community of
divisive gender-driven policies. Section V expands on why a joint custody
presumption is in conflict with the best interest of the child standard.
This Article concludes by observing that the District's new law is of
particular concern given the demographics of the jurisdiction. As with
welfare reform, rhetoric supporting this law places considerable blame
for societal woes on the parent who is raising children single-handedly,
and in poverty. The law must not be used as a wedge to further isolate
welfare mothers, causing more division where unity of spirit and purpose
need to be fostered. Yet, it has the potential to do this if parents are
placed in artificial and unfamiliar unions that can undermine the efforts
being made by single parents.
The serendipitous approach to custody reflected in the District's pre-
sumption does not account for the real harm done to relationships when
marriages or other familial unions dissolve, or when they never formed.
Because courts must meet their obligation to protect children, the new
law cannot be interpreted as a license to abandon analysis of the many
factors-impact of anger, lack of trust, fear, and/or irrelevance due to
lack of involvement-that indicate what may be in the child's best inter-
est. The new law cannot be viewed as a shortcut to custody decision-
making since it raises far more questions than it answers.
3. Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 966 (Md. 1986) (citing David J. Miller, Joint Cus-
tody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 376 (1979)).
4. See, e.g., Lee E. Teitelbaum, Divorce, Custody, Gender, and the Limits of Law: On
Dividing the Child, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1808 (1994) (reviewing ELEANOR E. MACCOBY &
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY
(1992)). Teitelbaum finds that much of the earlier social research on custody was "less
than excellent and some [was] very poor." Id. at 1810.
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The appendices to this Article include a state-by-state analysis of joint
custody legislation and a model custody statute for the District of
Columbia.
I. CUSTODY By WHAT RULE?
From the beginning, courts have viewed their role with regard to child
custody determinations as one of parens patriae-a duty to protect vul-
nerable citizens.5 Consistent with that role, the best interest of the child
has been the driving standard, and, as such, statutory presumptions have
generally been stated in those terms.6 This judicial function consistently
has been muddled with parental interest in the companionship, care, cus-
tody, and/or management of their children. Thus, the law reflects an
often unresolved conflict between the child's needs and those of the
parents.7
The roots of the authority in Anglo-American law to act on behalf of
the safety and welfare of children dates back to the seventeenth century
and the equitable jurisdiction of the English courts.' Determining cus-
tody was simple: the father received sole custody except in cases where
the father was found to have gone beyond accepted norms.9 The paternal
preference was based on the English common law rule recognizing the
father's right to his children's services (the "fruits of their labor") in re-
5. Cf. Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY
L.J. 195, 205 (1978).
6. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2)(d) (stating that a presumption exists
that joint custody is in the best interest of the child); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2)(d)
(same); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-S-24(4) (same). In fact seven states and three territories
refer to the child's best interest but make no reference to joint custody in their statutes:
Arkansas, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Virginia, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1993); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-06.1 to -06.2
(1991 & Supp. 1995) (including no explicit reference to sole or joint custody, but stating
that evidence of domestic violence "creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who
has perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded sole or joint custody of a child");
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law Co-op. 1985); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-15 (1995 & Supp. 1996); 19 GUAM CODE ANN, § 4106, 9108 (1995) (presum-
ing that the mother receive custody of a child of "tender years"); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31,
§ 383 (1993); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 109 (1996).
7. This concept has acquired the status of a fundamental right of biological parents.
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
8. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 477 (2d ed. 1987).
9. Id. (citing Shelley v. Westbrook, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817) (denying a poet "cus-
tody of his children on the ground of his immorality, atheism and denial of the Christian
revelation")).
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turn for his obligation to provide for their welfare.'" The paternal pref-
erence was undermined by the British Act of 1839 which directed courts
to grant custody of children under age seven to their mothers, and visita-
tion rights to mothers of children seven years of age and older." Despite
American courts' adherence to paternal preference, in 1796, the earliest
reported American child custody case, a Connecticut court rejected the
paternal preference presumption and held that it was in the child's best
interest to stay with his mother and maternal grandfather.'"
Despite its rocky debut in this country, the paternal preference was not
firmly replaced by the "tender years" doctrine until the early twentieth
century. This doctrine acknowledged that both parents had equal custo-
dial rights, but presumed that mothers were the best custodians of chil-
dren of "tender years."' 3 Recognition of this presumption reflected
changes in the family structure that arose out of the industrial revolu-
tion.'4 The doctrine also defied the traditional notion that granting cus-
tody to a completely dependent mother was unrealistic. 5 The "tender
10. See Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Re-
visited, 1 HARV, WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 112 (1978).
11. See Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHIL-
DREN 121-22 (1994). The British Act of 1839, known as the Talfourd Act, was intended to
determine custody for children seven years of age and younger. It was, in fact, the first
major challenge to the paternal presumption. Id. at 122. Kelly observes that in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, America applied a paternal preference in divorce custody
cases, but by the nineteenth century, no longer applied the preference as strictly as English
law. Id. In fact, many states enacted statutes modeled on the Talfourd Act; others enacted
laws giving both parents equal custodial rights. See id.
12. See Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody
After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 687, 695-96 & n.18 (1985) (referring to Nickols v. Giles, 2
Root 461 (Conn. 1796), as one of the earliest cases in which the child's interest was a
factor). Professor Schepard also notes that since the 1840's, New York statutes and court
decisions have instructed judges to make the welfare of the child the dominant considera-
tion in custody decisions. Id. However, as late as 1839, New York espoused the father's
virtually absolute right to sole custody. See State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 273 (1860)
("[It] is a well settled doctrine of the common law, that the father is entitled to the custody
of his minor children."); cf People v. Mercein, 8 Paige Ch. 45 (N.Y. Ch. 1839).
13. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used
in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 235 (1982). The term
"tender years" has not been defined often, however, seven years of age frequently is cited
as its limit. Id. Some courts have noted that the "tender years" doctrine may apply until
the child reaches the age of 14. See Williams v. Williams, 296 A.2d 870, 871 (Pa. Super Ct.
1972).
14. See Kelly, supra note 11, at 122 (noting that during the Industrial Revolution, fa-
thers sought employment away from the farm or village and mothers became the primary
caregivers of children).
15. See Karen Czapanskiy, Child Support and Visitation: Rethinking the Connections,
20 RUTGERS L.J. 619 (1989). Professor Czapanskiy points out that the father's duty of
support was linked to his right to receive services from the child. See id. at 646-47. Consis-
tent with this reciprocal support duty theory, separated and divorced fathers were not re-
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years" doctrine has been largely discredited for its inconsistency with the
concepts of gender equality and the role of the father in child rearing.16
Another alternative that has been suggested is the primary caretaker
presumption. This presumption is not inherently gender driven and, in-
stead, focuses upon which parent has been most involved in the child
rearing responsibilities. 7 This approach is more consistent with the "best
interest" paradigm since it is tied directly to parental involvement with
the child, as opposed to generic assumptions about gender roles. The pri-
mary caretaker presumption has been noted, however, as effectively
favoring women and not sufficiently crediting the less routine contribu-
tions of fathers. 8 For this reason, the approach has not received the
support that its nexus to caregiving would suggest.
Somewhat recently, yet another presumption with a shift in focus, mid-
way between the father-mother poles, has invaded the child custody land-
scape.' 9 Over the past two decades, joint custody has been the solution a
la mode. Joint custody ostensibly strives for gender equity in its alloca-
tion of parental rights and obligations. Unfortunately, in its preoccupa-
sponsible for support of non-indigent children who were in their mother's custody. See id.
at 647. This concept of the theory did not change until children's presence in the
workforce declined for economic and moral reasons. See id. at 646-49; see also Uviller,
supra note 10, at 112-14 (discussing the change in child custody in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries through the imposition placed on fathers by the "tender years" doc-
trine to support children who were not in their custody).
16. See Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377, 1382-83 (D.C. 1978) (disapproving of the
maternal preference and stating that it was "inconsistent with the basic tenet ... that the
best interest of the child should control"); Cooke v. Cooke, 319 A.2d 841, 844 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1974) (holding that the maternal preference should be used only where it is
"impossible to decide upon the evidentiary facts"), superseded by 1974 Md. Laws 181 (July
1, 1974) (eliminating custody preference based solely on gender)- (repealed) or MD. ANN.
CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1974)): Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973)
(finding the "tender years" doctrine unconstitutional deprives the father of Equal Protec-
tion under the 14th Amendment).
17. See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L.
REV. 497, 521-23 (1988). The primary caretaker preference eliminates much of the bicker-
ing and confusion inherent in custody determinations by awarding custody to the parent
who has been most responsible for raising the child. See id. at 522. Furthermore, even
though the primary caretaker is likely to be the mother, the choice is not inherently dis-
criminatory and it encourages both husband and wife to assume greater co-parenting roles
during marriage. See id.
18. See Kelly, supra note 11, at 130 (discussing the main objections to the primary
caretaker presumption). According to Dr. Kelly, the major problems with such a presump-
tion are that it ignores the quality of the child's relationship with the primary custodian and
punishes men for being the primary wage earner during the marriage. See id.
19. Split custody, the concept of dividing the sole custody of two or more children
between parents, is also part of the arsenal of custody options. Most jurisdictions, how-
ever, prefer to keep siblings together. See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 415 A.2d 1378, 1380 (D.C.
1980) (citing Utley v. Utley, 364 A.2d 1167 (D.C. 1976) for the proposition that split custody
arrangements are disfavored in the District of Columbia).
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tion with parents this approach tends to invert the wisdom of Solomon by
instructing the courts to divide the child in the name of settling the par-
ents' conflicting claims. °
Notably, custody policy has not directly addressed the impact of vari-
ous preferences on different segments of the population. Demographic
considerations are significant for a jurisdiction such as the District of Co-
lumbia, a city whose population is composed predominantly of black fam-
ilies, many of whom live below the poverty line.21 Black families and, in
particular, poor, black families have essentially been ignored in the devel-
opment of child custody law.22 Economics have always skewed the rela-
tionship between custody analysis in the dominant culture and the
20. 1 Kings 3:16-28 relates the story of two prostitutes who each gave birth to a son
within days of the other. One woman's son dies in the middle of the night and she claims
that the other woman gave her the dead child and stole the living one from her. Each now
appears before King Solomon and claims the living child as theirs.
So the king said, "Get me a sword." When they brought a sword before him, he
said, "Cut the living child in two, and give half to one woman, and half to the
other." The woman whose son it was, in the anguish she felt for it said to the
king, "Please, my lord, give her the living child-please do not kill it!" The other,
however said, "It shall be neither mine nor yours. Divide it!" The king then
answered: "Give the first one the living child! By no means kill it, for she is the
mother."
Id.
The King Solomon story has been used regularly as an analogy to joint custody. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 974 (Md. 1986); Singer & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 502.
21. The 1990 Census reports that of the 606,900 residents of the District of Columbia,
399,604 are black; 179,667 are white; and 32,710 are of Hispanic origin (including 4,391 who
are also listed under the statistic for black residents). 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION, GEN-
ERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, District of Columbia at 3. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION-GENERAL POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS-DIsTRICr OF COLUMBIA (May 1992) [hereinafter CENSUS-GENERAL
CHARACTERISTICS]. There were 88,793 black families reported, and of those, 14,849 were
listed as living below the poverty level. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION-SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS-DIs-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA (Sep. 1993) [hereinafter CENSUS-SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS]. The total number of families living below the poverty level was listed
as 16,453. See id. at 52. 46,797 D.C. residents reported that they were divorced. Of those
divorced, black residents accounted for 31,784; CENSuS-GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS,
supra at 42.
22. At the time when the paternal preference was shifting to a maternal preference in
the United States and Great Britain, slave parents could not contemplate marriage. Fur-
thermore, many children were born as the result of rape of black slave women by white
owners and overseers. The children were often taken from their slave mothers and sold to
other owners. "The sexual exploitation of black women was unprecedented. Black women
were considered breeders, not mothers. Some slavers specialized in selling black children
between the ages of 8 and 12." Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater,
Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman
Syndrome, 1995 Wisc. L. REV. 1003, 1033 n.124, (citing MANNING MARABLE, How CAPI-
TALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA 71-72 (1983)).
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situation for impoverished black families. William Julius Wilson, in his
recent publication, When Work Disappears, discusses the sharp increase
in joblessness for black males since 1970 and its connection to the rise in
the rate of single-mother families.23 According to Wilson, the decreasing
marriage rates among inner-city black parents reflects the "interaction
between material and cultural constraints."24 Societal norms, including
those that promote taking responsibility for raising children are weak-
ened when there is no opportunity to reinforce them due to economic
failure.25
While protecting the best interest of the child is the appropriate goal
for any population considered, the overlay of custody analysis, based on
white, middle-class precepts of gender rights and privileges regarding the
raising of children, does not sufficiently account for the realities of paren-
tal roles and responsibilities in many District of Columbia households.
To the extent that the District's joint custody presumption is intended to
influence parental role allocation, it is overly ambitious in that it ignores
the considerable pressures described by Wilson.
II. WHAT DOES A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF JOINT
CUSTODY MEAN?
A. What Does Joint Custody Mean?
Joint custody can refer to joint legal custody, in which both parents
share in the decision-making. How that decisionmaking is shared can
vary: one parent may play a consultative role only, or one parent may
make all of the major decisions while the physical custodian handles the
day to day supervision, and so on. Joint custody can also refer to joint
physical custody, in which the child spends time with each parent, either
on a roughly even basis or in blocks of time that are, in effect, no greater
than visitation under a sole custody arrangement. The D.C. Court of Ap-
peals recently made the distinction that joint legal custody refers to long-
range decisions, and physical custody refers to control over the child and
decisions related to immediate control.26 Joint legal custody generally ac-
companies joint physical custody, but the converse is not always the case.
In fact, most joint custody awards grant physical custody to one parent,
23. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 95-97 (1996) (discussing the
inner-city joblessness and its impact on the structure of the black community, relying on
several studies dating from 1987-1993 of poor neighborhoods in Chicago).
24. Id. at 97 (quoting Mark Testa, Male Joblessness, Nonmarital Parenthood and Mar-
riage (paper presented at the Chicago Urban Poverty and Family Life Conference (Octo-
ber 12, 1991))).
25. Cf id.
26. See Ysla v. Lopez, 684 A.2d 775, 777-78 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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but limit that parent's decision-making power by requiring collaboration
with the other parent. z7
Many state statutes suggest that joint custody is monolithic; 8 however,
this ignores the subtle and not so subtle distinctions it encompasses. The
silence in many statutes on the issues of the child's physical location and
which parent has responsibility for the child reflects a desire to allow for
greater flexibility in fashioning joint custody orders consistent with the
best interests of the child.2 9 Yet, this very concern inculpates a joint cus-
tody presumption: if flexibility to the point of being completely amor-
27. A Massachusetts study of 500 divorces found that 90% of all joint custody awards
granted joint legal custody only. W. P. C. Phear et al., An Empirical Study of Custody
Agreements: Joint Versus Sole Legal Custody, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 419, 425, 440 (1983),
cited in Singer & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 503-04, n.39. One District of Columbia Supe-
rior Court Judge observed that when he asks litigants about joint custody, the fathers he
encounters are clear that they want joint legal custody only. Judge Jose Lopez, Dialogue
with Bench and Bar, September 24, 1996. See ELEANOR E. MNOOKIN & ROBERT
MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 113 (1992)
(reporting that in 48.6% of the 933 California families studied, joint legal custody and sole
physical custody was awarded to the mother; sole legal custody and sole physical custody
was granted to the mother in 18.6% of the cases; joint legal custody and sole legal custody
was awarded to the father in 6.8% of the cases; and sole legal and sole physical custody was
granted to the father in 1.8% of the cases).
28. There are twenty-four states which delineate distinctions between joint physical
and joint legal custody. Generally, they describe joint physical custody as meaning that
each parent shall have significant periods of physical custody and that physical custody
shall be shared in such a manner to ensure that a child has frequent and continuing contact
with both parents. Joint legal custody is described as meaning that the parents will share in
the decision-making rights, responsibilities and authority in regard to a child's health, edu-
cation, and welfare. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-151 (Michie 1975) (defining each); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 25-402 (West Supp. 1996) (explaining that neither parents' decision-making
rights are superior); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3083, 3084, 3085 (West 1994) (stating that a grant
of joint legal custody does not necessitate an award of joint physical custody); CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-123.5(1) (1987); CONN, GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(a) (West 1995); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-9-6 (1991); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46.1(b) (Michie 1993); IDAHO
CODE § 32-717B (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(f) (Michie 1987); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 598.1(3), 598.41(1)(a) (West 1996 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1610(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1996);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a(7)(b) (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West
Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(5)(d) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (West
Supp. 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.490 (Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:17 (1992) (dictating that joint custody may not include physical custody, where the
court finds physical custody to be conducive to the child's best interests); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2-4 (West 1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5302 (West 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-
3-10.1 (1995) (granting courts the power to make an award of exclusive authority to one
parent to make certain specific decisions); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 664 (1989); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-124.1 (Michie 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West 1993).
29. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 970 (Md. 1986) (discussing the equitable
powers of Maryland courts to enter joint custody orders, and observing that "the power of
the court is very broad so that it may accomplish the paramount purpose of securing the
welfare and promoting the best interest of the child").
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phous is necessary to make the presumption palatable, why state the
concept as firmly as the District of Columbia has done?3"
B. Rebuttable Presumption: What Weight Should the Term Be Given?
Throughout the debate on the District of Columbia's Joint Custody of
Children Act there was much discussion as to what impact the presump-
tion in favor of joint custody might have. Opponents of the presumption
argued that it suggested a priority inconsistent with a focus on the best
interests of the child.31 Proponents argued that since the presumption
was to be rebuttable, it would be easily overcome by evidence that indi-
cated that joint custody was not in the best interest of the child. A rebut-
table presumption ultimately was accepted based on the understanding
30. One father describes the impact of joint physical custody on his son as follows:
Nicolas has lived in joint custody for the past eight years, and you would think he
would be used to it by now. He is not. His emotional preparation begins a week
or so before he flies to visit his mother. (Nicolas lives with me when he is in
school.) He becomes, to varying degrees, anxious, lethargic, somber and with-
drawn from his friends ....
... Though he would never want to have to choose between his parents, neither
would he choose joint custody.
And neither would I choose it for him if I had the chance to make the decision
again .... His mother and I should have agreed on sole custody. If we had not
been able to agree, it should have been imposed. Though it would have been
devastating for the one of us who lost custody of our son, I am convinced that
Nicolas's childhood would have been easier.
David Sheff, If It's Tuesday, It Must Be Dad's House, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 26, 1995, at
65.
31. See Transcript of the Twenty-first Meeting of the Council of the District of Colum-
bia, at 260, Dec. 5, 1995 [hereinafter Twenty-First Transcript]. Councilmember William
Lightfoot stated:
Children are not chattel. They don't belong to the man. They don't belong to the
woman. They should not be regarded as being some pawn that we divvy up be-
tween two warring spouses. We should arrange the best that we can, so they can
grow up in a loving and nurturing community and not allow us to think that in
some ideal situation we can create a legal fiction where both parents are going to
be together, but, in fact, they're going to harm the child as they stay together.
Id.
He later stated:
The reason I have opposed this rebuttable presumption in favor of joint custody is
because it does not put the best interest of the child first. It really does treat
children as if they were property that was acquired during the marriage ....
... Now we can talk about a Pollyanna world and the ideal word, about how we'd
love for things to be, but that's not the way they are, and, once again .... we
ought to ask ourselves what is it that's got us on the far extreme? Is it some
theoretical notion we have of what's good? Is it some theoretical notion we have
of our good intentions ... ?
Transcript of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Council of the District of Columbia, at
169-70, Jan. 4, 1996 [hereinafter Twenty-Second Transcript].
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that it would stand only so long as there was no evidence that suggested
an alternative custody arrangement was in the best interest of the child.32
Consistent with the Act's legislative history is the well-established un-
derstanding that, although a rebuttable presumption imposes a burden of
producing evidence on the opponent of the presumption, this party has
no further burden of persuasion.33 The presumption "disappears so soon
as substantial countervailing evidence is introduced." 34
In Jaramillo v. Jaramillo,35 the Supreme Court of New Mexico directly
addressed the impact of a presumption on the burden of proof when it
determined that placing the burden of proving that joint custody was not
in the best interest of the child on a relocating parent unconstitutionally
impaired the relocating parent's right to travel. The Jaramillo court fur-
ther held that once a party seeking to relocate has demonstrated that the
joint custody arrangement is no longer workable, both parties share
equally the burden of demonstrating with which parent the child's best
interests will be served. 36 The Supreme Court of Montana held in In re
Marriage of Jacobson that a finding by the District Court of a lack of
32. "If we are serious about the best interest of the child being the principle that
comes first, if that's the primary consideration in awarding custody, then we ought not to
have a rebuttable presumption in favor of joint custody. It's inconsistent to have two pri-
mary principles." See Twenty-First Transcript, supra note 31, at 255 (statement of
Councilmember Kathleen Patterson). Responding to Ms. Patterson, Councilmember John
Ray, a stolid supporter of the presumption, said, "A presumption does not mean that a
judge cannot do something else." Id. at 261. Mr. Ray elaborated further at the next read-
ing of the bill. Speaking again in support of the presumption, he stated, "This is not a
mandatory requirement. It's merely a presumption .... The trier of facts can look at all of
the facts and make a decision that it's not in the best interests." See Twenty-Second Tran-
script, supra note 31, at 160. Councilmember Harold Brazil, the sponsor of the legislation
and of amendments preserving the initial bill's presumption, added, "[I]t's clearly a bill
that is talking about doing what's in the best interests of the child. That is the standard.
That's the way it was and that's the way it will continue to be under [the amendment that
would make joint custody presumptive]." Id. at 162. Mr. Brazil also stated, "[J]udges are
wise, and what we are saying is, 'Here, you people with the wisdom look. We're giving you
the direction we want you to go in, but if it's not in the best interests of the child, then
don't award joint custody."' Twenty-First Transcript, supra note 31, at 266.
33. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 301 ("In all civil actions and proceedings.., a presumption
imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evi-
dence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of
proof in the sense of risk of nonpersuasion.")
34. Stone v. Stone, 136 F.2d 761, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1943); see also Lincoln v. French, 105
U.S. 614, 617 (1881) ("Presumptions are indulged to supply the place of facts; they are
never allowed against ascertained and established facts. When these appear, presumptions
disappear."); Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374, 1378 (La. 1984) "A presumption does not
have any probative value, but merely provides the fact-finder with a conclusion in the
absence of proof to the contrary." (citing 9 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2491(3) (3d ed.)).
35. 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991).
36. Id. at 308.
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parental cooperation was enough to rebut the joint custody presump-
tion.37 The same court held in In re Marriage of Dunn that "[t]here is no
mandate that joint custody must be awarded even if both parents are
found to be fit and proper." 38 These cases illustrate that courts grappling
with the presumption in favor of joint custody recognize that, procedur-
ally, the presumption stands only so long as there is no countervailing
evidence.3 9 Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has not considered an appeal from the application of the jurisdiction's
new joint custody presumption directly, in Ysla v. Lopez, the court re-
ferred to the new statute in ruling that no single factor is necessarily con-
trolling, and thus the parents' inability to communicate and cooperate
may not preclude an award of joint custody where both parents have a
strong interest in raising the child."n
III. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S JOINT CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
ACT OF 1996
A. The Law in the District of Columbia Prior to April 18, 1996
Prior to the enactment of the joint custody legislation, the law in the
District of Columbia unambiguously placed the best interest of the child
at the center of legal analysis in custody determinations. This has been
the custody standard in the District since the turn of the century, and
reference to it may be found in the District's divorce statute.41 The di-
vorce statute prescribed a best interest of the child analysis in two sepa-
rate sections-one for custody during the pendency of the action, 2 and
one for permanent custody. n3 These custody provisions provided the
court with guidelines similar to those found in other custody statutes: the
wishes of the child; the wishes of the child's parents; interaction with par-
ents, siblings and other individuals to whom the child is emotionally or
37. See In re Marriage of Jacobson, 743 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Mont. 1987).
38. See In re Marriage of Dunn, 735 P.2d 1117, 1119-20 (Mont. 1987).
39. See supra note 2 (providing a list of state statutes that include a presumption).
40. See Ysla v. Lopez, 684 A.2d 775, 781 (D.C. 1996).
41. See Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d at 1377, 1379 (D.C. 1978) (noting the historical
importance of the best interest standard); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911 (1989).
42. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911.
43. See id. § 16-914. This section is captioned "Retention of jurisdiction as to alimony
and custody of children," and begins with the phrase "After the issuance of a decree of
divorce ...." This language seems to create a gap between this section and the pendente
lite custody available under section 16-911, unless the custody decree was originally con-
ceived by the D.C. Council to be a separate order that would follow the divorce award,
thus making section 16-914 the permanent custody provision. This is the most logical con-
clusion, but the legislature and the court have not labored over the ambiguity. Permanent
custody pleadings tend to cite section 16-914, and temporary custody pleadings refer to
section 16-911.
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psychologically connected; the child's adjustment to home, school and
community; and the mental and physical health of all involved.4 4 In 1994,
a new consideration was added to this analysis which instructed the courts
to credit the impact of abuse of one parent by the other in making cus-
tody and visitation awards.
45
The District's statutory guidelines regarding custody decisions, if read
literally, could only apply in the context of divorce cases, at least prior to
1996.46 In essence, while the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
has had an equitable basis for making custody determinations, there has
been no statutory standard for granting custody outside the divorce con-
text.47  Nonetheless, courts have consistently applied the divorce statute
44. See id. §§ 16-911(a)(5), 16-914(a)(3).
45. See Evidence of Intrafamily Offenses in Child Custody Cases Act of 1994, effective
Aug. 25, 1994,41 D.C. Reg. 4870 (1994) (amending D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-911, 16-914, 16-
1005). This amendment specified that a court must justify, in writing, a grant of custody to
a contestant who has been shown to have committed an intrafamily offense, and it further
required that visitation with the abusive party be limited to those situations in which it can
be demonstrated by that party that the child and custodial parent will be adequately pro-
tected from harm. See id. This provision references the District's domestic violence or
"intrafamily offense" statute, which defines domestic violence as any criminal act against a
person with whom the person has a relationship by blood, marriage, legal custody, having a
child in common, having lived together at some point or having had a romantic relation-
ship: See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (5) (Supp. 1996).
In a recent article, I discussed the impact on children who witness violence in their
homes:
Children who witness parental violence are always affected; they are traumatized
by shock, fear, and guilt. Children suffer somatic complaints, such as insomnia,
diarrhea, generally higher rates of illnesses as infants, and a higher incidence of
colds, sore throats, abdominal pain, asthma, headaches, as well as bed wetting for
older children. The effect of parental violence on children is also evidenced by
delayed speech, delayed motor and cognitive skills, and poor school performance.
In addition to the effects that result from witnessing violence in the home, chil-
dren are often "accidentally harmed by blows or flying objects aimed at the
mother, or are stepped on, or stumbled over, or dropped when the mother is
attacked."
Margaret Martin Barry, Protective Order Enforcement. Another Pirouette, 6 HAST. W. L.J.
339, 341-42 (1995) (citing EFFECT OF WOMAN ABUSE ON CHILDREN, infra note 127).
46. See infra Part III(B)(11) (discussing the 1996 Act and the reference in both section
16-911 and section 16-914 to custody determinations without regard to marital status).
47. Section 11-1101(4) of the D.C. Code grants the Family Division of the court exclu-
sive jurisdiction over "actions seeking custody of minor children," and section 16-4501 et
seq. grants the court jurisdiction to make child custody determinations as part of the juris-
diction's adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 9 U. L. A. 115
(Supp. 1996). See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1101(4), 16-4501 (Supp. 1992). Outside of di-
vorce, however, the standard for determining custody is based on the equitable powers of
the court. See Ysla v. Lopez, 684 A.2d 775, 778 (D.C. 1996); Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964,
968-70 (Md. 1986) (discussing the equitable powers of Maryland courts to enter joint cus-
tody orders and observing that "the power of the court is very broad so that it may accom-
plish the paramount purpose of securing the welfare and promoting the best interest of the
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in all custody cases in the jurisdiction.48 Prior to the Joint Custody of
Children Act of 1996 (the Act),49 the statute was silent as to joint cus-
tody. This did not mean that joint custody was unavailable in the jurisdic-
tion because such custodial arrangements were accepted by courts where
both parties consented.5" Joint custody arrangements were accepted even
though joint custody was considered suspect, particularly for children of
tender years.51 Rather than codify the practice of awarding joint custody
to parties who agree to such an arrangement, the new law creates a pre-
sumption that shifts the focus away from the child, despite the childrear-
ing problems inherent in parental discord, and toward the parents.
child."); Felder v. Allsopp, 391 A.2d 243, 245 (D.C. 1978) (referring to the court's jurisdic-
tion over visitation, custody, and divorce, based on its equitable powers rather than section
11-1101(4)).
48. The application of the divorce statute in custody disputes between unmarried par-
ties has been so consistent that, in a case a few years ago, when a judge on his first rotation
in the Family Division of the Superior Court asked opposing counsel and I to advise him of
the authority upon which he could rely in deciding the case (since the statute we had cited
technically did not apply), we both were caught off guard. The judge ultimately was con-
vinced that the lack of an alternative statutory standard resulted in the practice of relying
upon the divorce statute.
49. 43 D.C. Reg. 574 (1996) (amending D.C. CODE ANN. 16-911, 16-914).
50. "Due to the current practice in the D.C. Superior Court to approve voluntary joint
custody arrangements, the absence of a joint custody statute in the District of Columbia
tends to cause*difficulty only in those situations where the parents do not agree to a joint
custody arrangement." WILLIAM P. LIGHTFOOT, REVISED COMMITTEE REPORT, BILL 11-
26, at 3 (Oct. 25, 1995) (D.C. Council Judiciary Comm. revised report on the Joint Custody
of Children Act of 1995 (retitled)) [hereinafter REVISED REPORT]. Case law illustrates
that joint custody was utilized by the court as an acceptable custody solution prior to the
enactment of the joint custody statute. See Galbis v. Nadal, 626 A.2d 26 (D.C. 1993). The
original order by the trial court was for joint custody. See id. at 28. It was later modified to
an award of sole custody in the mother due to a change in circumstances; the court found
that the parties could no longer agree on basic child rearing decisions because the father
had disregarded the trial court's directive that the mother was to have the final decision-
making power. See id.; see also Ysla, 684 A.2d at 779-80 (acknowledging the trial court's
discretion to make a joint custody order not agreed to by both parents, while noting that
the ruling was influenced by the passage of the Joint Custody of Children Act); cf. Weiner
v. Weiner, 605 A.2d 18, 18 (D.C. 1992); McDiarmid v. McDiarmid, 594 A.2d 79, 80 (D.C.
1991); Cooper v. Cooper, 472 A.2d 878, 879 (D.C. 1984).
51. See, e.g., Utley v. Utley, 364 A.2d 1167,1170 (D.C. 1976). The District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals expressed its concern regarding joint custody of young children as
follows:
Generally, divided custody of a child of tender years is not favored .... Perhaps
the reason for this is that an orderly, meaningful, and reasonably secure family
life is crucial during the formative years of a child's life. A happy and normal
family life is often impossible of accomplishment when a child of tender years is
subjected to the frustrating experience of divided custody especially when in the
process he is shifted from home to home, from city to city, or from one family
environment to another.
Id.; see also Singer & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 510 (noting the impact on children of
"shuttling" them between parents).
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B. The New Law
The District of Columbia's joint custody legislation was hotly debated,
especially as to the role of a presumption in favor of joint custody. As
initially voted on by the Judiciary Committee of the D.C. Council, the bill
removed the presumption in favor of joint custody;52 the Committee later
voted to reinsert the presumption.53 The presumption favoring joint cus-
tody then was replaced at the first meeting of the Committee of the
Whole by a presumption against joint custody where the parties could not
agree.54 At the final reading, however, the presumption favoring joint
custody returned to replace the negative presumption. Not surprisingly,
the bill, as amended, passed with limited support.55 The result is an act
that resembles the language of other presumptive joint custody statutes,
yet unfortunately, reflects the fallout of its bumpy legislative process.
1. The Best Interests of the Child and the Joint Custody Presumption
The new Act amends the pendente lite and permanent custody provi-
sions of the D.C. Code with variations in language that can be best ex-
plained as poor drafting (see Appendix B).56 As the following discussion
52. See REVISED REPORT, supra note 50.
53. See id.
54. See Twenty-First Transcript, supra note 31, at 294.
55. The vote on the final reading of the bill was 7 in favor to 6 opposed. See Twenty-
Second Transcript, supra note 31, at 177.
56. The Revised Committee Report provides no rationale for restricting the more spe-
cific language of the new law regarding the mechanics of joint custody to interim orders.
See REVISED REPORT, supra note 50. Nor does the Judiciary Committee Report dated
June 21, 1995, which reports a version of the bill including similar restrictions, provide any
rationale. See Judiciary Report, supra note 50. Very few jurisdictions make a distinction
between temporary and permanent custody orders. In addition, where other jurisdictions
include temporary custody provisions, they are generally far less detailed than the perma-
nent ones. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 727(b)(1) (1993) (providing that a court may
grant a temporary custody arrangement not to exceed six months in time to enable the
parents to show their ability to cooperate with the arrangement; and further stating that
the Court may continue or modify the arrangement on a permanent basis); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1996) (granting the parents temporary shared legal
custody of any minor child of their marriage upon the filing of a custody action, but permit-
ting the court to award temporary sole legal custody if it determines that shared custody is
not in the best interests of the child and stating that there is no presumption for temporary
shared physical custody); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-213 (1995) (permitting the court to
award temporary custody, and if there is no objection, to act solely on the basis of the
affidavit); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.194 (West Supp. 1997) (stating that a parent
who seeks temporary custody of a child may do so by filing a motion with the court to
which an opposing parent must file a responsive parenting plan); 19 GUAM CODE ANN.
§ 4123 (1995) (permitting the court to award custody of a minor child to either parent
during the separation period); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 341 (1993) (awarding custody of
children to the mother during a divorce proceeding, unless strong countervailing evidence
to the presumption is presented).
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will identify, a number of components of the new law that have the po-
tential to clarify its application, do not specifically apply to permanent
orders. Since a pendente lite hearing can require the same level of proof
as a permanent custody hearing, this phase of the litigation is often by-
passed, particularly by less affluent litigants who are either unaware of
the temporary process or who cannot afford the protracted litigation.57
In practice, many of the provisions limited by statute to the temporary
order will inevitably spill over into the final decrees. The new law, how-
ever, is unclear concerning permanent custody. While the court may
choose to interpret the statute narrowly by limiting its application to tem-
porary orders, it is difficult to extract from the legislative history an intent
to create such a limitation.58 Nonetheless, statutory interpretation sup-
ports the conclusion that if language in one section of the law is not incor-
porated into another section, the court should not infer legislative
intent.59
Both sections of the Act establish a "rebuttable presumption that joint
custody is in the best interest of the child."6" The language further pro-
vides that the best interest of the child standard still controls, describing it
as the "primary consideration."'" Consistent with this emphasis, the
Act's reference to "frequent and continuing contact" between each par-
ent and child and shared responsibility of child rearing is modified by the
disjunctive "[u]nless the court determines that it is not in the best interest
of the child."62
57. The bypassing of the temporary custody hearing occurs even for litigants who ob-
tain pro bono representation. If parents work, the additional court appearances can create
considerable pressures on the job. If they do not work, the costs of transportation to and
from court and arranging for child care can be daunting. I have had clients express consid-
erable concern as court hearings multiplied, were continued, or became protracted, be-
cause of child care constraints and transportation costs.
58. While there had been some discussion that the new law should be limited to cus-
tody disputes arising in the context of divorce, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
rejected that distinction in its first ruling interpreting the new law. See Ysla v. Lopez, 684
A.2d 775, 777-78 (D.C. 1996).
59. "[T]he expression or inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of others .... [l]t is
generally accurate to assume that when people say one thing they do not mean something
else." 2A KEN SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION
§ 47.01 (5th ed. 1992); accord District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 638 (D.C.
1991) (Schwelb, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the court's interpretation of the District's
Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act); see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432
(1987) (."[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."' (quoting United
States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
60. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-911(a)(5), 16-914(a)(2) (Supp. 1996).
61. Id. §§ 16-911(a)(5), 16-914(a)(3).
62. Id. §§ 16-911(a)(5), 16-914(a)(2).
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The amendment to section 16-911 describes further the various custody
permutations available, listing joint legal and joint physical custody
among the options.63 This is the only indication in the statute that joint
custody has multiple meanings. Section 16-914 does not even say this
much. There is no preference for joint legal or physical custody, or a
combination of both, stated in either section in connection with the
presumption.
2. Factors to Consider in Assessing What Is Best for the Child
The new law provides, in both sections of the statute, a list of factors
for the court to consider in making a joint or sole custody determina-
tion.64 These new factors generally offer useful guidelines for judicial as-
sessment of custody petitions; however, they neither simplify the custody
process nor suggest that joint custody is ideal. A discussion of the new
factors as they relate to joint custody follows.
a. Shared Decision Making
The capacity to communicate and reach shared decisions is central to
the success of any joint custody arrangement.65 Studies have shown that,
63. See id. § 16-911(a-2)(1).
64. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-911(a)(5), 16-914 (Supp. 1996). While the ordering is
slightly different in each section, the Act amends both sections 16-911 and 16-914 by ad-
ding additional factors for the court to consider:
(F) the capacity of the parents to communicate and reach shared decisions af-
fecting the child's welfare;
(G) the willingness of the parents to share custody;
(H) the prior involvement of each parent in the child's life;
(I) the potential disruption of the child's social and school life;
(J) the geographical proximity of the parental homes...
(K) the demands of parental employment;
(L) the age and number of children;
(M) the sincerity of each parent's request;
(N) the parent's ability to financially support a custody arrangement;
(0) the impact on Aid to Families with Dependent Children and medical
assistance;
(P) the benefit to the parents; and
(Q) the evidence of an intrafamily offense as defined in § 16-1001(5).
65. See Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 971 (Md. 1986) (stating that agreement is
"clearly the most important factor"). Beth Weisberg, a practitioner with considerable ex-
perience with joint custody, describes joint custody as a "wonderful, necessary" option that
can offer the best result for children if the parents are motivated and willing to make it
work. According to Ms. Weisberg, if the parents are not committed to joint custody, it can
be a source of continuing the conflict that is a major reason that parents tend to separate.
Ending the conflict can provide a major benefit to children. Conversation on April 2, 1997
with Elizabeth J. Weisberg. Ms. Weisberg has practiced domestic relations law in the state
of Maryland since 1979.
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without cooperation between the parents, joint custody arrangements are
doomed to fail.66
Even where there is a commitment to communicate and cooperate, a
joint custody order can be risky. Changing demands on one or both par-
Two jurisdictions require an agreement between the parties before a joint custody order
will be granted. See OR. REV. STAT. § 107.169(3) (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 665(a)
(1989). Two other jurisdictions make joint custody presumptive only if the parties agree to
it. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214(6) (West Supp. 1995); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.26a(2) (West 1993). Some jurisdictions qualify this presumption and find that if the
parties agree to joint custody, this creates a presumption that it is in the best interests of
the minor child. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (Deering 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-56a(b) (West 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (4) (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 125.490(1) (Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(1I)(a) (1992) (referring to joint
legal custody only); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 665(a); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17
subd. 2 (West Supp. 1997) (stating that a court shall find a rebuttable presumption that
joint legal custody is in the best interests of the child upon request of either or both
parties).
The ability of parties to co-parent (specifically the ability to agree and communicate) is
considered as a factor in making joint custody awards in several jurisdictions. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(1.5)(g) (1987); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.1 (West Supp. 1996);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(g)(2) (Michie Supp. 1996); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 598.41(3)(c) (West 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214(5) (West Supp. 1995);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a(1)(b); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 subd. 2; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(B)(8) (Michie 1996); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Anderson Supp. 1994); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.134 (West
Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b)(8); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.187(2)(c)(3) (West
Supp. 1997).
66. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 549-69 (1984) (reviewing the studies on the effects of joint
custody and concluding that courts should not impose joint custody where it is apparent
that the parties will be unlikely to cooperate). Professor Chambers sets out six prerequi-
sites to imposing joint custody for judges who "sense an uncomfortable tension, indeed
inconsistency, between the legislature's expression of enthusiasm for joint custody and the
legislature's more overarching injunction to resolve each case to serve the best interests of
the child." Id. at 567. They are:
(1) the child in question is not three years of age or younger; (2) both parents
seem reasonably capable of meeting the child's need for care and guidance; (3)
both parents wish to continue their active involvement in raising the child; (4) the
parents seem capable of making reasoned decisions together for the benefit of the
child; . . . (5) joint custody would not impose substantial economic hardship on
the parent who opposes it; and (6) joint custody would probably disrupt the par-
ent-child relationships less than other custodial alternatives.
Id.; see also Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
455, 471, 487 (1984) (noting that the importance of agreement and respect is emphasized in
the studies and observing that even the most ardent of the early joint custody advocates
assumed that it is appropriate only where the parties voluntarily agreed to it); Janet R.
Johnston, Research Update: Children's Adjustment in Sole Custody Compared to Joint Cus-
tody Families and Principles for Custody Decision Making, 33 FAM. AND CONCILIATION
CTs. REV. 415 (1995) (including discussion of recent studies and concluding similarly to
Scott and Derdeyn that joint custody is not advisable where the parties are in conflict).
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ents due to employment, marriage or remarriage, or relocation can cause
tensions that undermine and ultimately destroy the arrangement.67
While such eventualities would not necessarily preclude a joint custody
award, they do underscore the difficulty of imposing interaction implicit
in the marital relationship upon parties who are not in that relationship.
It is even more difficult to contemplate such interaction for parents who
have no previous familial relationship. Furthermore, to make a child the
focus of the imposed interaction can be harmful to a child who feels re-
sponsible for any resulting discord or who has conflicting or insufficient
guidance.
b. Willingness to Share Custody
The "willingness to share custody" factor could be interpreted to mean
that where parents are unwilling to share custody, joint custody should
not be granted. The phrase has more commonly been viewed as calling
upon the courts to penalize the "unfriendly" parent.68 Parents who
might otherwise raise good faith objections to the wisdom of a joint cus-
67. See Richard A. Gardner, Joint Custody Is Not for Everyone, FAM. ADVOC., Fall
1982 at 7, 45-46. Dr. Gardner notes that "[a] smoothly operating joint custody arrange-
ment may run into trouble if one [or both] of the parents remarries," especially with the
new obligations to the stepparent and possibly stepchildren. Id. at 45. Other changes such
as differences in job responsibilities, relocation, or simply a deterioration in the necessary
communication and cooperation can destroy the arrangement. See id. at 45-46.
68. Although numerous states have public policy statements in their custody statutes
which encourage children having "frequent and meaningful continuing contact" with both
parents, see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(1) (Deering 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.13(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996); Mor. CODE ANN. § 40-4-223(1)(b) (1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 125.480(3)(a) (Michie Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112(C)(3)(a)
(West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(2) (1995), some states go one step further
and penalize those parents who are uncooperative or less likely to promote such contact.
See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(A)(6) (West Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.41(1) (West Supp. 1996). But see Newell v. Nash, 889 P.2d 345, 349-50 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1994) (indicating that consideration of which parent is more likely to ensure frequent
and continuing contact does not mandate that custody be awarded to the parent who would
allow the most visitation).
"The parent who wishes to demonstrate that joint custody is detrimental to the child's
welfare [may] be reluctant to use evidence which may [reflect an] unwillingness to cooper-
ate." Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 66, at 476. See generally Joanne Schulman & Valerie
Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Custody: Analysis of Legislation and Its Implications For
Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 539 (1982); Joan Zorza, "Friendly
Parent" Provisions in Custody Determinations, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 921, 924-25
(1994) (stating that these provisions create many problems for women in custody disputes,
particularly those in domestic violence situations); Family Violence in Child Custody Stat-
utes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L. Q. 197, 202 (1995)
("[R]ecently, the ABA's Center on Children and the Law stated that friendly parent provi-
sions are inappropriate in domestic violence cases and proposed that state legislatures
amend such laws.").
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tody arrangement may remain silent if raising such objections could po-
tentially result in loss of custody entirely. A "willingness to share
custody" provision can be particularly treacherous for women, since wo-
men generally are held to higher parenting standards than men and tend
to be blamed for breakdowns in custody and visitation arrangements.
69
Furthermore, women usually are believed less than men and/or their con-
cerns are more often trivialized.7" This is particularly true for poor, black
women who are often considered suspect by nature and treated with
disdain.71
Generalizations that discount objections to shared custody are unwise.
A custody award cannot be driven by a desire to punish the parent who
believes that co-parenting is not a reasonable solution. That parent may
have sound reasons for the objection, and, may prove to be the most in-
volved, the most nurturing, and, therefore, the best candidate for custody.
c. The Wishes of the Parents and the Sincerity of Each Parent's
Requests
The District of Columbia's Joint Custody of Children Act instructs the
court to take into account the parents' wishes,7" as well as the sincerity of
each parent's custody proposal.73 This requires the court to review care-
fully objections to custody to ensure that they are concerned with the
welfare of the child. Furthermore, section 16-911(a-2)(6)(B) of the Act
provides that one parent's objection to any custody arrangement cannot
be the sole basis for denying an order that the court deems to be in the
child's best interests.74 This section has no counterpart in the permanent
custody provisions of section 16-914. Prior to the Act, joint custody or-
ders had been entered only by agreement of the parties. This provision is
intended to clarify the change in practice, at least for temporary orders.
A substantive argument linked to the child's welfare is now required to
sustain an objection to any custody arrangement.
Limiting this provision to temporary orders may be advantageous to a
single mother who never had a familial relationship with the child's father
and who intends to bypass the pendente lite phase of the litigation. The
mother simply may argue that she does not wish to enter a foreign, com-
69. See Zorza, supra note 68, at 923.
70. See id.
71. See generally Ammons, supra note 22 (discussing the difficulty of applying the bat-
tered woman syndrome to black women given the negative stereotypes and imagery of
black women within the culture).
72. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a)(5)(B) (Supp. 1996).
73. Id. § 16-911(a)(5)(M).
74. Id. § 16-911(a-2)(6)(B),
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plex relationship with the other parent. In any event, to the extent that
the father has been absent, starting a joint custodial relationship may be
beyond the court's ability to establish, despite a broad interpretation of
its legal authority. Furthermore, translating joint custody into only joint
legal custody in such situations will not make the law more acceptable. It
may, in fact, cause resentment, frustration, and rejection in a parent who
is ordered to share decisions with a previously absent and uninvolved
parent.
75
d. Prior Involvement in the Lives of the Children
Assessing prior involvement in the lives of the children is consistent
with the concept that the primary caretaker is usually the preferred custo-
dian. With joint custody, the court must still be concerned with the non-
primary caretaker parent's involvement in the child's life. If that involve-
ment is minimal, the interest in joint custody is suspect. When one par-
ent's involvement in child rearing has been minimal, the court needs to
assess carefully the motivation and commitment to raising the child. Fur-
thermore, if the court orders shared physical custody or visitation for a
previously uninvolved or minimally involved parent, a course of adjust-
ment for the child and the parent may need to be specified.
A corollary of the lack of involvement in child rearing is the situation
in which one parent is not really committed to the arrangement. Often,
this parent pursues joint custody and gets it, but then fails to assume re-
sponsibility. The parent raising the child does not have clear authority
and can be subjected to the whim of the uncooperative parent. 76 Cur-
rently, there is no precedent for sanctioning a failure to exercise visitation
rights,77 nor is there precedent for enforcing a parent's failure to meet the
75. Many of my clients have expressed outrage at the prospect of having to provide
visitation to or share information with a parent who previously paid absolutely no atten-
tion to the child, a sentiment that would be compounded by a joint custody order.
76. Cf. Marygold S. Melli & Patricia R. Brown, The Economics of Shared Custody:
Developing An Equitable Formula For Dual Residence, 31 Hous. L. REv. 543, 555 (1994)
(asserting that father visitation tends to decrease over time, while mother visitation re-
mains stable or tends to increase).
77. In describing cultural norms that ascribe parenting responsibilities to the mother,
Professor Karen Czapanskiy referenced the following quote: "[T]he mother has an 'un-
shakable responsibility' to her child which the father does not share." Czapanskiy, supra
note 15, at 645 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), and Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978)). Professor Czapanskiy observes that this cultural reality has worked
to the detriment of mothers where courts have given priority to the non-custodial parent's
rights without according the same level of priority to the non-custodian's responsibilities.
Id. at 645-46. The very identification of visitation as a right instead of an obligation indi-
cates the failure to link visitation to the best interest of the child standard. It is purely a
benefit granted to the non-custodial parent, often with little regard to the child's interests.
One of the more troublesome expressions of that perspective was seen in the Chicago case
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custodial responsibilities under a joint custody arrangement. 78 Conse-
quently, the opportunity to abuse joint custody by using it as a means to
avoid child support or to maintain control over a partner without acquir-
ing any greater childrearing responsibilities is considerable.79
e. Age of the Children
Many experts, as well as the D.C. Court of Appeals, have raised con-
cern over the age of the children in the context of issuing joint custody
orders.8° The concern focuses on the particular need for stability for very
young children in meeting their developmental and emotional needs and
the disruption that shared physical custody can cause.81  Some have ar-
gued, however, that younger children can adjust better to such disrup-
tions in the long term than older children.82 Still, others have raised
sufficient concern with regard to the impact of shared custody on children
of all ages to give courts pause in fashioning arrangements that will re-
quire awkward or disruptive schedules.83
f Stability
Interaction with siblings and significant others, disruption of social and
school life, and the geographic proximity of parents all speak directly to a
child's stability. Joint physical custody is inherently problematic in this
regard, and is second only to parental collaboration in the hierarchy of
concerns that must be addressed. Studies have shown that a significant
in which two girls, ages 12 and 8, refused to comply with the court order that they visit with
their father for several weeks during the summer. The trial court found the two girls in
contempt and had the older child sent to the detention center in shackles, while the
younger one was grounded at home. The ruling was upheld by an appellate court, but was
stayed pending further appeal. On April 4, 1996, the court affirmed the ruling denying
modification of visitation, and the finding of contempt against the two girls, but reversed
the sanctions imposed and remanded for further proceedings. See In re Marriage of Mar-
shall, 663 N.E.2d 1113, 1122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); see also Mark Hansen, Minor Adjust-
ments, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 38.
78. If the circumstances can be proven, violation of the terms of the agreement could
result in modification of the joint custody award. Interestingly, this result may not be ac-
ceptable to the parent who is not at fault and yet is unwilling to shoulder the entire
obligation.
79. See infra note 144 (discussing "custodial blackmail").
80. See supra notes 73-74.
81. See Utley v. Utley, 364 A.2d 1167, 1170 (D.C. 1976).
82. See Paul R. Amato, Life Span Adjustment of Children to their Parent's Divorce, 4
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 141, 149 (1994).
83. See, e.g., Janet R. Johnston et al., Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects On Chil-
dren of Joint Custody and Frequent Access, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 576, 588 (1989)
(a study of parents who were entrenched in disputes over custody and visitation, conclud-
ing that children who have more frequent access are more emotionally troubled and be-
haviorally disturbed).
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number of children suffer when they constantly are shuttled from one
household to another, particularly when this involves leaving their neigh-
borhood.84 No studies appear to analyze the impact such movement has
on children in poor, inner-city neighborhoods. There is no basis, how-
ever, for expecting that the impact of such disruption would be any less
difficult for these children.
Parents committed to joint physical custody can compensate for the
disruptions it causes by working to coordinate safety, as well as access to
friends, family, school activities and social events. This scenario is not
realistic, however, when resources are extremely limited, when the par-
ents live more than a few miles apart, when the parents have no premise
for such collaboration, or when the children find the organizational pres-
sures of living in two households so intrusive that they outweigh the ben-
efit of the other parent's involvement.
g. Financial Consequences
The very premise of the Child Support Guidelines 5 indicates that fi-
nancial comparisons were not intended to result in custody being
awarded to the more affluent parent, or to the parent whose earning po-
tential may seem greater.86 It is more likely, particularly given the statu-
tory context, that the "parent's ability to financially support a custody
arrangement" refers to the financial hardship, if not impossibility, for
84. See id.; see also Susan Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint Custody
Arrangement: A Report of a Study, 51 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403 (1981). Dr. Stein-
man reports, in a 1978-80 study of twenty-four families who pioneered joint custody on
their own prior to express authorization of joint custody under California law, that while
most children adjusted, twenty-five percent of the children were confused and unhappy
because of the demands of living in two households. See id. at 410-12. Dr. Steinman
strongly advocated the need for more studies, yet it is noteworthy that even in this highly
motivated group, a significant percentage of the children were stressed by the living ar-
rangements. See id. The situation is exacerbated when one parent decides to move to
another locale. See Paula M. Raines, Joint Custody and the Right to Travel: Legal and
Psychological Implications, 24 J. FAM. L. 625, 649 (1996). Professor Raines presumes that
joint custody is beneficial, but argues that the benefits break down when one parent de-
cides to remove the children to another jurisdiction.
85. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.1(b) (Supp. 1996) ("[T]he guideline shall set forth
an equitable approach to child support in which both parents share legal responsibility for
the support of the child .... When child support is established, the child shall not live at a
standard substantially below that of the noncustodial parent.").
86. The District of Columbia's human rights law is intended to end all forms of dis-
crimination. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (Supp. 1996). The consideration of one par-
ent's financial ability to support a custody arrangement should not discriminate against the
parent who stayed home to raise the children or whose earning capacity is less for a
number of reasons, including status in the society.
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most parents to provide adequately for children in two households.8 7
The number of children factor compounds this consideration since dual
households reduce resources available to meet the child's needs. Dif-
fusing the resources available for children is particularly troublesome in a
jurisdiction like the District of Columbia where many households fall
close to, or below, the poverty line. As discussed below, listing the im-
pact on Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Medicaid as yet
another factor for the court to consider is not helpful since it is unclear
what the impact might be. It has been argued that orders making both
parents equally responsible for childrearing would reduce the disparity
between the mother's and the father's standard of living.88 Such an argu-
ment does not take into account the increased costs of providing for dual
residences for the children or the impact of disabling choices implicit in
shared parenting. Significantly, it does not take into account another side
effect of joint custody: the hardship faced by the parent who shoulders
the bulk of the financial responsibility by virtue of de facto sole physical
custody, with little contribution from the parent who fails to meet the
obligations ordered by the court.89 Although such a situation may be
remedied by returning to court, anticipation of court costs, fees, time,
child care, lost wages, the unavailability of legal help, the proof required
and the hostilities such action would reignite may lead to the unintended
consequence of one parent shouldering the burden with little or no con-
tribution on any level from the other parent. 90
87. "Seriously shared physical custody requires two units large enough to house parent
and child on a permanent basis-along with lots of child-rearing accoutrements ... which
must be present in both units." Singer & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 513.
88. Dean Herma Hill Kay favors joint custody awards that make fathers equally re-
sponsible with mothers for childrearing after divorce. Such awards would allow mothers to
be more competitive in the workplace. She argues that the "large disparity between men's
and women's household standard of living... should be greatly reduced." Herma H. Kay,
Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CINN.
L. REV. 1, 86 (1987).
89. It has been my experience that many non-custodial parents have little interest in
visiting their children under sole custody orders. It is not likely that this lack of commit-
ment will magically change under a joint physical custody order.
90. The tax consequence of a joint physical custody arrangement is yet another piece
of the financial framework that should be addressed if joint custody is to be ordered. If,
for example, each parent has the child for 50% of the year, neither parent will be entitled
to claim the child as a dependent for federal tax purposes, not to mention related District,
or state, credits and deductions. The reason for this is the Internal Revenue Code rule that
the parent having custody for the greater portion of the year gets the dependency exemp-
tion. See 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(1) (Supp. 1994). Exceptions to the rule such as ones provid-
ing for multiple support arrangements and release of claim by a custodial parent, allow
parents to avoid an unfair result. See 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(2) (Supp. 1995). Using these
provisions, a parent who has the child for half of the time each year could agree to waive
the exemption in alternating years, and the parent who has the child for more than half of
1997]
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h. The Demands of Parental Employment
Complimentary time frames may drive how physical custody is divided
and result in a schedule in which children have regular access to each
parent. This might occur, for example, where one parent works days, and
the other works nights. This exceptional scenario often is alluded to by
proponents of joint custody who argue that the presumption of joint cus-
tody can be financially neutral or even beneficial since procuring child-
care is obviated.91 In contrast, if one parent has a very demanding job
which involves long hours or travel, sole physical custody should be
granted to the more available parent, with flexible visitation for the more
encumbered one. This arrangement may be viewed as shared physical
custody, with no more than the amount of visitation provided in a sole
custody order. The goal is to ensure supervision, caring, and attention to
the children; one parent may, by virtue of professional demands, be less
able than the other to do so.
i. Benefit to Parents
As the Maryland Court of Appeals pointed out in Taylor v. Taylor,
9 2
the benefit to the parents is relevant not only because their feelings and
interests are worth considering, but because the parents' improved self-
image is likely to benefit the child.93 However, the very nature of a cus-
tody battle voices parents' interests. The consideration of this factor un-
derscores the danger that a joint custody presumption poses when the
focus shifts from the child's needs to those of the parents. An earlier
version of the Act read "the benefit to the parents, not to be outweighed
by the best interest of the child."94 Fortunately, since it would seem to
have supported a definite conflict with the statute's emphasis on the pri-
macy of the child's interests, the latter phrase was dropped.
Implicit in custody law is this tension between the fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the raising of their children and the obliga-
the year could agree to waive the exemption every few years in proportion to the other
parent's significant custodial responsibilities. Contemplating and providing for such ar-
rangements as part of a parenting plan or, in the absence of such a plan, at the time that a
joint custody order is entered can avoid confusion, hostilities, and reduced financial capac-
ity to meet child rearing obligations later on.
91. See, e.g., Ronald K. Henry, The District of Columbia's New Joint Custody of Chil-
dren Act, The Washington Lawyer (July/August 1996). Mr. Henry asserts that "[s]hared
physical custody shares the burden of child care and allows both parents to have significant
workforce participation, thereby increasing total family income." Id. at 54.
92. 508 A.2d 964 (Md. 1986).
93. See id. at 974.
94. Amendment in the nature of a substitute, reported by the Judiciary Committee on
June 21, 1995. See Judiciary Report, supra note 50.
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tion of courts to limit that interest when the parents are not prepared to
exercise it in unison, or where they endanger the children.95 This strong
sense of right finds expression in joint custody presumptions that subject
the assessment of the children's needs to a reflexive conclusion that two
parents are ideal under just about any circumstance. In essence, children
are reduced to chattel in that they are subordinated to the proprietary
interest of their parents.96 That is why, when the courts do intervene as
the family structure is dissolving, it is primarily the parents who are
heard.97 Custody is about the raising of children. Children's voices are
silenced if their interests are not made the court's central concern.
3. Parenting Plans
The pendente lite section of the statute provides for an eleven-part
parenting plan. 98 Much has been said in the joint custody debate about
95. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty inter-
est of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evapo-
rate simply because they have not been model parents .... ").
96. See Twenty-First Transcript, supra note 31 (providing Councilmember Lightfoot's
remarks). D.C. Councilmember William Lightfoot was correct in his reference to children.
The reality of their status, however, equates to little more than property.
97. Even in abuse and neglect cases, the parents are present with their counsel, but the
guardian appointed on behalf of the children usually appears with the social worker, not
the children. The goal of these proceedings is to return the child to the neglectful or abu-
sive parent or parents, often on the off chance that the child will not suffer more. In 1994,
forty-eight states reported that 1,011,628 children were determined to have been victims of
abuse and neglect, and 1,111 children died as a result of abuse and neglect. See U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 1994: REPORTS FROM THE
STATES TO THE NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLEct 2-3 (1996). Nearly
80% of the perpetrators were parents. See id. at 2-9.
98. The components of the parenting plan provision are:
(i) the residence of the child or children;
(ii) the financial support based on the needs of the child or children and the
actual resources of the parent;
(iii) visitation;
(iv) holidays, birthdays and vacation visitation;
(v) transportation of the child or children between the residences;
(vi) education;
(vii) religious training, if any;
(viii) access to the child's or children's educational, medical psychiatric, and
dental care records;
(ix) except in emergencies, the responsibility for medical psychiatric, and den-
tal treatment decisions;
(x) communication between the child and the parents; and
(xi) resolving conflict such as a recognized family counseling or mediation ser-
vice before applying to the court to resolve a conflict.
D.C. Code Ann. § 16-911(a-2)(2)(A) (Supp. 1996). All except the second of these are
useful considerations for parties contemplating joint custody. The reference to financial
1997]
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the importance of parenting plans, and several state statutes specifically
refer to them.99 Parenting plans have the benefit of compelling parties to
hash out the specifics of the arrangement they are undertaking.100 The
support suggests that the issue is more open than it should be, given the application of the
Child Support Guidelines. The guidelines identify what "actual resources" are relevant in
the support context and, to the extent that joint custody amounts to less than a 40/60 divi-
sion of physical custody, there is no ambiguity as to what the amount of support is to be.
The danger with this language is that it encourages the use of child support as a bargaining
chip in the course of coming to a consensus on the custody arrangement. At a minimum, it
has the potential to mislead litigants as to what the correct analysis should be for purposes
of determining support. See id. §§ 16-911(a)(5); 16-914(a)(3); see also id. § 16-916.1(n)
(providing child support guidelines regarding the impact of a 40/60 or more shared custody
arrangement).
99. There are ten states which require parties to submit proposed parenting plans to
the court prior to a grant of joint custody. Arizona's provisions regarding parenting plans
provide a good example of what these plans should delineate:
1. Each parent's rights and responsibilities for the personal care of the child and
for decisions in areas such as education, health care and religious training.
2. A schedule of the physical residence of the child, including holidays and
school vacations.
3. A procedure by which proposed changes, disputes and alleged breaches may
be mediated or resolved, which may include the use of conciliation services or
private counseling.
4. A procedure for periodic review of the plan's terms by the parents.
5. A statement that the parties understand that joint custody does not necessar-
ily mean equal parenting time.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(I) (West Supp. 1996); see also ALA. CODE § 30-3-153
(Michie 1975); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.1 (West Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1996) ("At the trial on the merits, if... either party seeks
shared legal or physical custody, the parties, jointly or individually, shall submit ...a
shared custody implementation plan."); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 452.375(8) (West Supp. 1997)
("Any decree providing for joint custody shall include a specific written plan setting forth
the terms of such custody. Such plan may be suggested by both parents acting in concert,
or one parent acting individually, or if neither ... the plan shall be provided by the court.);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-223(b)(2) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(F) (Michie 1996);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 109(C) (West 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181
(West Supp. 1996) ("In any proceeding ...each party shall file and serve a proposed
permanent parenting plan."). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 727 (1993).
In addition, there are eight states which indicate that the submission of parenting plans
in joint custody proceedings is discretionary. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(1) (West
1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123.5(3) (1987) (allowing the court to formulate its own
plan if no plan is submitted or one submitted is not approved); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
911(a-2)(2)(A) (Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1994); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 42-364 (Supp. 1994); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Anderson 1996)
(parenting plans may be submitted for either sole or joint custody proceedings); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.007 (West 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §.666 (1989) (finding that an
agreement between the parties (or parenting plan) shall be presumed to be in the best
interests of the child, but the court does not have to adopt it if it finds it was not devised
voluntarily). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(e) (West 1969) (stating that the court may
require each party to submit a custody plan in cases in which the parties cannot agree).
100. See Lynne M. Kenney & Diana Vigil, A Lawyer's Guide to Therapeutic Interven-
tions in Domestic Relations Court, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 629, 645 (1996) (stating that when
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use of a standard parenting plan form provided by the court may be use-
ful to parents and judges when joint custody is to be awarded. The dan-
ger is that the court may rely too heavily on the forms, using them as
checklists, instead of making less mechanical custody determinations.
Furthermore, simply providing parenting plan forms will not give pro se
litigants insight into the level of detail needed to make the forms useful.
The forms also will not alleviate the difficulty and stress involved in pro-
viding the necessary information. Trained personnel will be needed to
render assistance to these parties. Given the number of pro se litigants in
the District of Columbia, this will require resources that were not antici-
pated by the court or the legislature when the new Act was passed.1 °1
Parenting plans are not mentioned in the permanent custody section of
the statute. If parenting plans are limited to pendente lite orders, their
benefits will be marginal, and they will be of little relevance to those liti-
gants who choose or need to bypass this phase of the litigation. While
established under only the pendente lite language of the statute, however,
the new law allows the court to require parenting plans in any custody
proceeding. Thus, the court could also ask for a detailed plan in perma-
nent custody cases, including sole custody cases.1 °1 Requiring detailed
plans in sole custody cases could be viewed as unnecessarily cumbersome,
except for the fact that the lines between sole and joint custody can be-
come infinitely porous under a statute such as this in which the definition
of joint custody is so malleable. Since the parenting plan language is per-
missive, judges1" 3 can pick and choose how to use it.'04
Judges should choose whether to use parenting plans with caution since
they can open a pandora's box of infractions for the court to address. 10 5
parents are in disagreement over matters concerning the child, parenting plans can help
them reach an agreement).
101. In 53% of all cases in the Family Division of the Superior Court, one or both of the
litigants are pro se. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW REP-
RESENTATION, D.C. BAR PUBLIC SERV. ACTIVITIES CORP., ACCESS TO FAMILY LAW REP-
RESENTATION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REP. 39 (Fall 1992).
102. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a-2)(2)(A) (Supp. 1996) ("[Iun any custody pro-
ceeding under this chapter, the court may order each parent to submit a detailed parenting
plan," thus including custody matters that do not contemplate joint custody and reaching
forward to incorporate permanent orders as well.). The reference to any custody proceed-
ing means that parenting plans could be required in sole custody cases as well.
103. The court rules allow Hearing Commissioners to replace judges in deciding cus-
tody, and other matters, with the consent of the parties. See D.C. SUPER. CT. FAM. DIV. R.
405(d) (1992). My references to judges are meant to include Hearing Commissioners.
104. In any event, judges should avoid disclosures in the cases involving domestic vio-
lence, child abuse or neglect and/or parental kidnapping that would place the vulnerable
parties at greater risk.
105. See Jane W. Ellis, Caught in the Middle: Protecting Children of High Conflict Di-
vorce, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 253, 261 n. 48 (explaining that the parenting
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Even with the counseling or mediation suggested in statutes, once parent-
ing plans are adopted, the court is the ultimate arbiter if these negotia-
tions break down, and it has virtually no options for reasonably resolving
much of the conflict.
106
4. Providing For Which Parent Makes Decisions Requiring
Immediate Attention
Section 16-911 also has another crucial element not reflected in the
permanent order provisions. It requires the court to designate a parent to
make decisions that need "immediate attention" regarding the health,
safety, and welfare of the child.' °7 Giving one parent clear authority in
emergency situations avoids the horror stories told of parental impasses
as a child lays on the operating table.'0 8 The phrase "immediate atten-
tion," however, encompasses more than pure emergencies. The parent
with such authority can make decisions regarding non-routine medical
care, schooling, counseling, travel, and so on. 109
plan sometimes exacerbates the conflict between parents rather than lessening it); see also
Mary Kate Kearney, The New Paradigm In Custody Law: Looking at Parents With a Lov-
ing Eye, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 543, 585 n.228 (1996) (concluding that courts do not desire to
arrange every aspect of a family's life).
106. Fines and jail sentences are both available to the court, but they cannot reasonably
address the many deviations from parenting plans, particularly when application of such
sanctions would only serve to exacerbate the problems raised. Change of custody is an-
other option the court may exercise, but it is a response the court reasonably would want
to reserve for serious infractions or where it is evident that the cooperation anticipated by
the order is not going to occur.
107. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a-2)(2)(C) (Supp. 1996).
108. See Singer & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 508-09 (discussing the situation of a hos-
pital refusing to operate on a child because the parents, who shared joint legal custody,
could not agree on whether to consent to the operation). See id (citing Levy & Chambers,
The Folly of Joint Custody, Fam. Advoc., Spring 1981 at 6, 8 (discussing a life-threatening
case in Colorado in which a hospital refused to perform an appendectomy on a child with
joint custodians because, while one parent consented to the procedure, the other parent
refused)).
109. One Maryland attorney recounted her experience with a nine year old boy suffer-
ing from attention deficit disorder who was known to jump out of windows, cut himself,
and so on. His neurologist, psychiatrist, and psychologist all agreed that he needed to be
hospitalized in order to closely monitor his medication. The child's father objected to any
medication and signed the boy out of the hospital. Neither parent had final say since the
joint custody order did not provide for final decisionmaking in this situation. The same
attorney recounted several of her cases in which the child had been enrolled in two schools
right up to the beginning of the semester, with the parties relying on the court to finally
determine which school the child would attend. Discussion with Cheryl Hepfer, March 27,
1997. Ms. Hepfer is a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers who has
practiced domestic relations law in the state of Maryland for over 25 years. See also,
Singer and Reynolds, supra note 17, at 508.
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Arguably, this decision-making authority subsumes the concept of joint
legal custody. However, if joint legal custody refers only to long-range
decisions, as indicated by the D.C. Court of Appeals in Ysla v. Lopez,
then the bulk of the issues requiring immediate decisions will fall to the
physical custodian. 110 In any event, children cannot be protected effec-
tively if important decisions are hamstrung by the inaccessibility of one
parent or by an impasse. Such situations will come up over the course of
the child's minority, and without a mechanism to resolve them short of
judicial intervention, children will suffer and the court will be
overwhelmed.
As suggested by the Ysla court, the parent having such authority to
make immediate decisions should be the parent with the most significant
contact with the child.' 11 It would be inappropriate to give less weight to
the decision-making authority of the more involved parent. A reasonable
award of joint legal custody would anticipate and foreclose manipulation
of long range decisions by the authorized parent who may otherwise be
tempted to delay action until situations require an immediate response.
Thus, while choice of the child's school would not normally fall under this
provision, a parent should not be able to put off the issue to the point at
which collaboration is no longer an option. Although parenting plans set
out parental responsibilities, it is difficult to expect that the court will be
equipped to handle the occasions on which breach may occur.
The statute limits determinations as to who will make the decisions that
require immediate attention to the parties seeking an interim order under
§ 16-911.11z There is no legitimate reason for doing so. In balancing the
children's needs and the parents' rights, the statute instructs the court to
give priority to the children. 3 Thus, even without this specific statutory
instruction in § 16-911, the court should anticipate and provide for the
authority to act when immediate action is required. Nonetheless, the
mandatory language of the interim order is simply not present in the per-
manent one, and to the extent that this decision-making authority is not
110. Cf. 684 A.2d 775, 777-78 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (defining legal and physical custody).
111. Id. In Aldridge v. Aldridge, the Tennessee Court of Appeals concluded as follows:
An important duty of the custodian of a child is to be available to make regular
and emergency decisions necessary in the life of the child, such as medical treat-
ment for injury or illness, choice of friends or associates, or activities. Such deci-
sions are best made by a person in close and constant touch with the child, and
available in emergencies.
Aldridge v. Aldridge, No. 01A01-9308-CH-00339, 1994 WL 49890, at *3 (Tenn. App. Feb.
18, 1994) (transferring legal custody from the mother to the father since the child spent
most of his time with his fither).
112. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a-2)(2)(C).
113. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-911(a)(5), 16-914(a)(3).
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extended to permanent orders, it supports the argument that an award of
joint legal custody is unwise.
5. Parenting Classes
Parenting classes are specified as an option under § 16-911, but not for
purposes of the permanent order. 1 4 As with other provisions, nothing
suggests a legislative intent to limit parenting classes to those who seek
interim orders, and the idea that such classes should be undertaken as
soon as possible does not account for the cases in which no interim order
is requested. Parenting classes may be a beneficial activity at any stage in
the case. Their inclusion in the context of joint custody underscores the
special challenge in such circumstances. The provision assumes, however,
that parties can afford to pay for parenting classes, since they are pro-
vided by the court in limited circumstances. 1 5 This simply is not the case
for the majority of the litigants in the District.
116
6 Child Support
The application of the Child Support Guideline does not extend to
shared physical custody arrangements in which the child spends forty or
more percent of the time with each parent. 11 7 Unfortunately, it is not
114. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a-2)(2)(D) (Supp. 1996).
115. District of Columbia Superior Court Social Services Division offers parenting
classes through Parents Empowering Parents (PEP). Referrals to the program are through
court probation officers, and generally involve cases in the Child Abuse and Neglect
Branch, the Juvenile Division, and noncustodial parents in domestic violence cases. Coun-
seling for children who have witnessed domestic violence is provided through another
Court Social Services Division program called Children of Violent Environments (COVE).
The program includes a parent counseling component. Referrals to this program are also
through probation officers. There are other family counseling services provided by this
division of the court, but the programs are designed to address problems in families where
abuse, neglect, and/or delinquency have introduced the families to the court system, and
where intervention is needed in order to avoid more drastic action by the court. Referrals
from the Child Abuse and Neglect Branch of the Court had caused a considerable enroll-
ment backlog for the PEP program which was recently alleviated somewhat by outsourcing
referrals. This does not suggest that the Court would be in a position to handle referrals
from the regular domestic relations docket.
116. Although not the benchmark for poverty status, proceeding without counsel in
court is often indicative of limited resources. More than fifty percent of all cases in the
Family Division have been reported as involving at least one unrepresented party. See
supra note 101.
117. In 1984, Congress mandated that all states and the District of Columbia adopt
child support guidelines as a condition of receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren. See 42 U.S.C. § 667 (1994). Awareness of a need for guidelines grew out of a nation-
wide movement, bolstered by government and academic studies, that challenged the
significant lack of consistency and fairness in child support awards. Specifically, support
awards tended to result in improved living standards for custodial parents and a corre-
sponding decline in the standards for non-custodial parents and the children. The Superior
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clear how child support will work in cases where shared physical custody
is approximated, or how the resulting lack of child support will benefit
the child when resources must be stretched between separate households.
While there are formulas within the statute for determining support in
these cases, the only requirement that stands when joint physical custody
is roughly equal is that the standard of living of the child should not be
less than that of the noncustodial parent. The meaning of this require-
ment is left to judicial discretion.' 8 The very existence of child support
guidelines throughout the country demonstrates that the exercise of such
discretion has not resulted in adequate support for children. 9
Section 16-911(a-2)(3) states that "[j]oint custody shall not eliminate
the responsibility for child support in accordance with the applicable
child support guideline as set forth in section 16-916.1. ''12° Unless re-
pealed or modified, the applicable child support guideline would apply
regardless of the legislation enacted. This language is not repeated in the
permanent order provisions. In fact, there is nothing in § 16-914 that re-
fers to support. Instead, the Act includes an amendment to the Child
Support Guidelines. which provides that child support can be considered
in any custody proceeding.121 The section appears after a detailed Child
Support Guideline that has been interpreted as applying to all proceed-
Court initiated its own guidelines in response to the federal mandate, but its authority to
do so was successfully challenged in court. See Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 566 A.2d 719, 722,
732 (D.C. 1989). Subsequently, the Guidelines were enacted by the Council of the District
of Columbia in 1990. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.1 (Supp. 1996).
Interestingly, the group that was most aggressive in its support of the joint custody legis-
lation, the Children's Rights Council, was the same group that appeared as amicus curiae
in support of the successful parties in Fitzgerald and opposed enactment of the Child Sup-
port Guidelines. See Fitzgerald, 566 A.2d at 720.
118. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.1(n) (Supp. 1996). Under this subsection, if the
child spends at least 40% of the time with each parent, the guideline is no longer presump-
tive, but another formula is suggested for allocating the responsibility between both par-
ents. Another subsection is intended to protect children from slipping between the cracks
of the various formulas. It states: "If the judicial officer determines that the presumption
has been overcome, the amount of child support ordered shall not reduce the standard of
living of the child to less than that of the noncustodial parent. The precise amount of child
support is within the discretion of the judicial officer." D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.1(p)(3)
(Supp. 1996). Similar guidelines exist in other jurisdictions. Cf CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-84 (West 1995).
119. See generally Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family
Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209 (1991) (arguing that discretion-
ary child support standards have produced awards that are inadequate to support custodial
households).
120. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a-2)(3) (Supp. 1996).
121. The amendment adds a new section entitled: "Proceedings in which child support
matters may be considered." D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916. 3 (Supp. 1996). This section states:
"The court may consider child support matters, as it deems appropriate, in any proceeding
to determine the care and custody of a minor child or children." Id.
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ings to determine the care and custody of minors, and seems to be a gra-
tuitous reference intended to neutralize criticism of the joint custody
presumption as an end run around child support.
122
7. Domestic Abuse
In the amendment to both sections of the statute, the presumption in
favor of joint custody seemingly is withdrawn where there is a showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that an intrafamily offense, an in-
stance of child abuse or neglect, or an instance of parental kidnapping
occurred. 123 These are important attributes of the Act and are consistent
with the District's legislative strides to protect survivors of domestic vio-
lence and their children.1 24 Much has been said about the need to amend
122. See id. § 16-916.1(a) (defining its scope as including any case brought under sub-
sections (1), (3), (10), or (11) of § 11-1101). Subsection (1) of § 11-1101 covers custody
cases in the divorce or separation context. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1101(1) (1981). Sub-
section (3) refers to support enforcement. See id. § 11-1101(3). Subsection (10) refers to
uniform support provisions by statutory designation, § 30-301-324, which have been re-
pealed, and though replaced by Chapter 3A, Interstate Family Support, the new sections,
30-341.1 to 30-349.1, are not referenced in the Guideline. See id. § 11-1101(10). Subsec-
tion (11) refers to paternity cases. See id. § 11-1101(11). These subsections do not quite
reach out of wedlock custody cases that are not paternity or support enforcement cases.
Thus, intentions aside, the language does clarify that certain out of wedlock custody
matters not fitting exactly within the specific language of the Guideline are covered. What
is troublesome is that, in addition to section 16-916.3, the firm language in section 16-911 is
not simply repeated in section 16-914. While it is not crucial, given the application of the
Guideline regardless of the language, the absence of the specific language may uninten-
tionally be interpreted as having no application to permanent custody awards.
123. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a)(2) (Supp. 1996); see also D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-1021 to -1026 (1989) (defining parental kidnapping); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2101(13)
(1995) (defining child abuse); id. § 6-2131(3) (defining child neglect); supra note 45 (defin-
ing intrafamily offense). The inclusion of the child abuse and neglect and parental kidnap-
ping provisions were added towards the end of the legislative process, as a result of the
Executive Comments submitted at the May 10, 1995 public hearing. See REVISED REPORT,
supra note 50.
124. See The Domestic Violence in Romantic Relationships Act of 1994 (codified in
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001(5) (Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1031 to -1034 (Supp.
1996)) (requiring mandatory arrest in domestic/intrafamily violence incidents); see also Ev-
idence of Intrafamily Offense in Child Custody Cases Act of 1994 (codified in D.C. CODE
ANN. §§16-911(a-1) and 16-914(a-1), 16-1001(5) (Supp. 1996)); Barry, supra note 45 (speci-
fying a preference for granting sole custody to the parent who is not abusive and requiring
that safety concerns be specifically considered in granting visitation where there is evi-
dence of domestic violence). These provisions are not amended by the new law.
Despite the Council of the District of Columbia's strong record in addressing domestic
violence, the fact that parent and child need distance and court-enforced protection from
the abusive parent seemed lost on one Council member who in his enthusiasm for passing
a joint custody presumption said, "I really believe that many of the murders that you read
about where you wake up and someone has walked in, shot the mother, shot the child
could be avoided if there was joint custody." TWenty-First Transcript, supra note 31, at
249.
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the reunification policy that returns children to parents who abuse or ne-
glect them.125 Without taking on that debate, the preference in a custody
dispute should be for the parent who would not do harm. Parental kid-
napping can also be very damaging to children and to the parent from
whom the children are taken. In some instances, it represents a desperate
attempt to achieve safety. Such kidnapping often goes hand-in-hand with
partner abuse, either with the abused parent fleeing or the abusive parent
taking the child as a further means of torment.
126
Abuse of one parent by another raises specific issues with regard to
children that only recently have gained the recognition they warrant in
custody determinations. While many children suffer physical injury as a
result of being in the line of fire, children who witness violence by one
parent against another often are harmed psychologically.12 7 It does
neither the child nor the abused parent any good to require that the
harmful contact continue, especially the level of interaction expected
under joint custody. However, raising abuse for the first time in the con-
text of a custody case is often viewed as inherently suspect. The parent
whose strategy for escaping abuse does not include pressing criminal
charges or seeking a protective order 128 may risk losing custody to the
abusive parent if the court disregards the undocumented evidence as op-
125. See, e.g., George H. Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K. ": A Child's
Right to be Heard, 27 FAM. L.Q. 365, 387 (1993). Russ argues that the national policy of
"family preservation" or "family reunification," which is not supported by any in-depth
analysis of family constitution, has resulted in tragedy for many children in this country.
Id. at 387. Russ contends that "[b]lind adherence to the family preservation policy using a
biological definition of family often flies in the face of the '"best interests of the child"' and
has led to the abuse, neglect, abandonment, and even death of literally thousands of chil-
dren in our country." Id.
126. See Julie Kunce Field & Mary S. Hood, Domestic Abuse Injunction Law and Prac-
tice: Will Michigan Ever Catch Up to the Rest of the Country?, 73 MICH. B.J. 902, 904
(1994). Professors Kunce Field and Hood observe that batterers often abuse their partners
through their children, and often abuse the children as well. Id. If the mother fails to
protect the children by not taking them with her, she may be charged with neglect. See id.
Further, abusive fathers frequently kidnap their children; most kidnapping parents are
male and more than half of all child kidnappings are domestic violence related. See id.
127. See generally NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, EFFECT OF Wo.
MAN ABUSE ON CHILDREN (1991) (reporting on the detrimental effects of exposure to
parental abuse and the recognition of this impact in child custody decisions); MARIA Roy,
CHILDREN IN THE CROSSFIRE (1988) (discussing the impact of spouse-battering on children
and encouraging intervention programs).
128. Because encountering the criminal system or seeking a protective order through
the courts can be an alienating and embarrassing experience, [m]any women choose simply
to separate. For an analysis of statistical information regarding abusive relationships, see
Michael J. Strube, The Decision to Leave an Abusive Relationship, in COPING WITH FAM-
ILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 93, 94 (Gerald T. Hotaling et al.,
eds. 1988).
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portunistic and applies an unfriendly parent penalty.12 9 Professor Karen
Czapanskiy made the following observation:
Studies of gender bias in the courts document how courts too
often disbelieve credible evidence of domestic violence and dis-
count its seriousness. Too often, judges ignore the substantive
law along with the evidence. Too often, their orders hurt wo-
men and children who come to court in family law cases. 3 '
The image of black women as domineering, tough, and destructive makes
it all the more difficult to assert that protection from an abusive father is
either justified or desirable.'31
One of my clients, a black woman with two children, refused to seek
child support, including medical coverage, or any limitation of visitation
from the father of her children, despite a history of abuse. The father had
communicated to her that she would be "Ojayed" 132 if she raised any of
these issues in the context of their divorce. Significantly, the court never
inquired about child support for the children or questioned the open visi-
tation arrangement, despite the fact that the initial pleadings referenced
the existence of a protective order and outlined a history of violence. It
was as though the court accepted her situation as tenable and was not
moved to inquire on behalf of the mother or the children as to the ab-
sence of protection or support.
129. See Zorza, supra note 68, at 923-25.
130. Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Les-
sons from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L. Q. 247, 249 (1993). Professor
Czapanskiy reports that in the Maryland gender bias task force survey judges and lawyers
were asked whether "child custody awards disregard fathers' violence against mothers."
Id. at 255. Approximately one third of the judges and male lawyers said "yes," and almost
two thirds of the female lawyers said "yes." Id. at 255-56 (citing GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS: REPORT OF THE MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN
TfE COURTS 280 (1989)). Over a fourth of the respondents to a similar District of Colum-
bia survey agreed that "'women who respond to domestic violence by leaving the home'
sometimes or often are viewed as 'unstable and less fit to have custody."' Id. at 257 (quot-
ing DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND
TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT 183 (1992)).
131. See generally Ammons, supra note 22 (discussing the difficulty black women face
in asserting the impact of domestic violence). Professor Ammons observes that:
Among the historical stereotypes that keep black women marginalized were
Mammy, Aunt Jemima, and Jezebel. Modern caricatures include Sapphire, the
matriarch and the welfare queen. These representations are so powerful that the
sight of a woman of African descent can trigger responses of violence, disdain,
fear, or invisibility.
Id. at 1049-52 (citations omitted).
132. The reference was to the fact that ex-athlete, movie and commercial star O.J.
Simpson had been acquitted in 1996 of the murder of his ex-wife and her friend, Ron
Goldman, despite considerable evidence to the contrary.
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The District of Columbia Code's definition of the term "intrafamily
offense" does not include emotional abuse. It has long been acknowl-
edged that emotional abuse can also be devastating as well. 133 A degrad-
ing statement or threatening look elicits conditioned responses associated
with previous psychological abuse. That abuse can take the form of isola-
tion, induced debility, monopolization of perception, degradation, and
random reinforcers or indulgences that keep alive the hope that the abuse
will cease. 3  Children who witness the anxiety, depression, and emo-
tional withdrawal of a parent experiencing emotional abuse will present
emotional or physical problems similar to those seen in children trauma-
tized by witnessing physical abuse. 135 Clearly, forcing contact in a juris-
diction where there is a presumption of joint custody with no specific
exemption in the case of emotional abuse runs contrary to the interests of
the child.
Thus, despite its strong language, the Act risks giving abusive parents a
greater opportunity to use custody as a means of continuing destructive
contact. This is particularly true since the presumption in favor of joint
custody may preclude sufficient analysis of the impact of psychological
abuse, or may preclude sufficient analysis of physical abuse if the abused
parent is hesitant to raise the history of abuse or is effectively silenced in
the attempt to do so.' 3 6
Even where there is a documented record, the Act does not oblige the
court to conduct its own investigation with regard to previous cases of
abuse, neglect, or parental kidnapping, and apparently the court does not
expect to do SO. 137 Furthermore, the extent to which the court has the
ability to conduct such an investigation is not clear. The court's current
limitations are referenced in section 3 of the Act and in the court's own
assessment of the budgetary impact of the Act, both of which suggest that
133. One woman made the following observation, "He beat me, but you know it was
the verbal abuse that killed me the most. I just felt like I was no good, I was trash, the
things he used to say to me .... BARRIE LEVY, IN LOVE AND IN DANGER 34 (1993).
134. See MARY DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING BATTERED WOMEN 25-27
(1992) (discussing psychological abuse and describing it as a form of torture).
135. See EFFEcr OF WOMEN ABUSE ON CHILDREN, supra note 127, at 22-45.
136. While to report an abusive parent to the child protective service agency is
common, equally common is for an abusive parent or his family falsely to accuse
the protective parent of child abuse as part of his control over her .... Mothers
are judged particularly harshly when allegations of child and sexual abuse are
raised in custody cases. A widely believed myth exists that women frequently and
falsely raise such allegations in custody cases to win tactical advantage.
Id. at 922-23.
137. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-911(a)(5), 16-914(a)(2).
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the court will not be equipped to access this information readily.138 Liti-
gants will have to do their own checking and cross-checking which may
be particularly difficult for those litigants proceeding pro se. The court,
however, is implementing a new Domestic Violence Plan, which includes
cross-referencing of criminal and domestic relations cases involving do-
mestic violence.139 This may result in ready access to information regard-
ing intrafamily offenses, but it is not evident that the prevention of child
abuse, neglect, or parental kidnapping will benefit in any way from this
plan.
8. Consent Orders
For interim orders, the Act codifies what has been, in effect, the prac-
tice for both interim and permanent custody orders by requiring the court
to enter all custody proposals that are agreed to by both parents, unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the arrangement is not in the
best interest of the child. 140  A departure from current practice is the
requirement that if the court hearing an interim support order determines
that a consent agreement is not in the best interest of the child, the court
must state its reasons for such a conclusion in writing.14 1 By requiring
judges to specify in writing why a consent agreement is being rejected, the
new law reflects the legislative intent that a judge who is not convinced
that the parents' proposal is adequate must take the time to justify that
conclusion. 14' Although meant to induce acceptance of consent orders,
the writing requirement does not absolve judges of their responsibility to
protect the best interests of the child. In contemplating a proposed joint
custody order, the best interests of the child standard obliges the court to
ensure that the parents have assessed all components of their joint agree-
138. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a)(3) (1981 & Supp. 1996). The Executive Officer
of the D.C. Superior Court responded by letter to an inquiry from the Chair of the D.C.
Council's Judiciary Committee that "the act does not specify who has the obligation of
raising the issue of domestic violence, and does not obligate the court to raise the issue sua
sponte." Letter from Ulysses B. Hammond, Executive Officer, District of Columbia
Courts, to William P. Lightfoot, Chair of the Judiciary Committee, Council of the District
of Columbia (Nov. 2, 1995) (copy on file with author). The letter went on to observe that if
the court did require a screening of each custody and visitation complaint in response to
this provision, the cost, short of implementing an integrated computer system, would be
approximately $30,000. See id. at 2. Computerizing the process would cost more, at least
initially. See id. No authorization for funding accompanies the bill.
139. The plan is outlined in THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PLAN
(1995), which outlines the findings and recommendations of the District of Columbia Do-
mestic Violence Coordinating Council. Implementation of the plan began on November
14, 1996.
140. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a-2)(6)(A) (Supp. 1996).
141. See id. § 16-911(a-2)(6)(C) (Supp. 1996).
142. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a-2)(6)(C).
[Vol, 46:767
1997] Joint Custody Presumption
ment, that they are committed to making it work, that their proposal fully
addresses the many contingencies, and that there is no reason to believe
that the child's interests will not be served by the arrangement. 143 This is
particularly true given the fact that joint custody can skew any custody
negotiation by giving the parent who is less interested in custody more
leverage. 144
143. See Bailey v. Bailey, No. 93APF12-1694; 1994 WL 530305 (Ohio App. Sept. 29,
1994) (holding that in determining whether shared parenting is in the best interest of the
child, the court shall consider the ability of the parents to cooperate and make decisions
jointly). The Ohio Court of Appeals found that the "long-standing and profound commu-
nication deficiency between the parents . . . would impair implementation of a shared
parenting plan. This circumstance alone would substantially contribute to a decision not to
order shared parenting in this case." Id. at 5; see also Danece Day Koenigs & Kimberly A.
Harris, Child Custody Arrangements: Say What You Mean, Mean What You Say, 31 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 591, 611 (1996) (arguing that joint custody should not be ordered in
situations in which the parents "have expressed a desire to avoid participation in the ar-
rangement"). However, these authors argue that joint custody promotes cooperation be-
tween the parents and it allows the child to live in a situation which mirrors the custody
and control from the marriage. They suggest that there is an added incentive for parental
cooperation in joint custody scenarios because the parties know that if they do not cooper-
ate, the court can modify the award and give sole custody to the party who will serve the
best interest of the child. See Richard K. Schwartz, A New Role For The Guardian Ad
Litem, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 117,122 (1987) (the minimum mandatory require-
ment for joint custody is the "parental consultation and agreement on all major decisions
affecting the children"). Schwartz proposes the appointment of a guardian ad litem as a
family mediator that can protect the interests of the children, promote the objectives of
joint custody, and provide the courts with a means of evaluating joint custody awards. Id.
at 118.
144. See Zorza, supra note 68, at 923. This impact is not limited to domestic violence
cases. Singer and Reynolds reference an article by Chief Justice Richard Neely of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, who practiced as a domestic relations lawyer prior to
taking the bench. In describing what he called "custody blackmail," Chief Justice Neely
wrote:
Divorce decrees are typically drafted for the parties after compromises reached
through private negotiation. These compromises are then approved by a judge,
who generally gives them only the most perfunctory sort of review. The result is
that parties (usually husbands) are free to use whatever leverage is available to
obtain a favorable settlement. In practice, this tends to mean that husbands will
threaten custody fights, with all of the accompanying traumas and uncertainties
... as a means of intimidating wives into accepting less child support and alimony
than is sufficient to allow the mother to live and raise the children appropriately
as a single parent. Because women are usually unwilling to accept even a minor
risk of losing custody, such techniques are generally successful.
Singer & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 516 (quoting Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker
Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168, 177
(1984)). Singer and Reynolds also quote a California study in which one-third of the di-
vorced women reported that their husbands had threatened to ask for custody as a ploy in
negotiations. See id. (citing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 310
(1985)). In my experience, the numbers are closer to 50%. In one of the more extreme
cases, the father, who had visitation rights, would show up for visitation one out of ten
times. If his daughter was not ready for him the moment he arrived, he would call the
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As with other aspects of the new law, the reason the restriction on the
court's authority with regard to consent orders applies only to interim
orders is not clear. It would seem that the policy considerations that en-
dorse parental consensus with regard to child rearing would extend be-
yond the temporary, and often non-existent, phase of the pendente lite
order.
9. Representation for the Child
Children are generally absent and unrepresented in custody matters,
with the result being that cases are presented in terms of the parents'
views and desires. The language in § 16-911, for which there is no parallel
in § 16-914, authorizes the court to appoint a guardian ad litem, an attor-
ney, or both to represent the minor child's interests. 145 Although the
Act's language does not expand the court's current authority, it demon-
strates a heightened concern that children have a voice in the context of a
statutory scheme that may be in conflict with their interests. 146 The
Council's efforts maybe ineffective, however, because most domestic rela-
tions litigants in the District of Columbia cannot afford counsel for them-
selves, and the court does not have the resources to provide counsel for
their children. To the extent that the legislature hoped to resolve con-
cerns about the joint custody presumption's adverse effects on the wel-
fare of children by authorizing representation for them, it missed its mark
by not appropriating funding to pay for it. Unless provided by the court,
appointment of counsel for children is simply not a realistic option, ex-
cept for the minority of relatively affluent litigants. 47
police and come with them to get her, claiming that her mother had refused him visitation.
Then he would immediately file, pro se, a motion for contempt, and his negotiations, each
time, consisted of the offer to give up all visitation if the mother would release him from
any obligation to pay child support. But see MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 27, at 11
(finding that no empirical studies exist to support the contention that divorcing husbands
routinely use the threat of a custody fight to reduce or eliminate their alimony and child
support obligations). See generally Shulman and Pitt, supra note 68, at 559-60 (discussing
the bargaining that goes on over custody).
145. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a-2)(5) (Supp. 1996).
146. This provision adds nothing to the court's current authority to appoint counsel to
represent the interests of minors in custody disputes. The text of the prior law states: "In
any proceeding wherein the custody of a child is in question, the court may appoint a
disinterested attorney to appear on behalf of the child and represent his best interests."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-918(b) (1989) (amended 1996); see also Harris v. Harris, 119
D.W.L.R. 665, 669 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 1991) (discussing the role of the guardian ad
litem and attorney for a 35 year old, mentally handicapped woman in a child support case).
The Harris court did not distinguish between a guardian ad litem and an attorney and used
the terms interchangeably.
147. See Eisenberg v. Eisenberg, 357 A.2d 396 (D.C. 1976) (appointing guardian ad
litem to represent the children's interests in a custody modification proceeding and requir-
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10. Modification of Custody Orders
The Act as initially introduced would have allowed the court to modify
existing custody orders from sole to joint custody.1 48 Apart from further
inundating the court's domestic relations docket, long-established custo-
dial relationships would have been subject to significant change based on
the passage of this new law. After a fair amount of legislative debate, the
statute makes clear that mere passage of the Act does not constitute a
change in circumstances sufficient to modify a custody order.
149
ing the father to pay for the court-appointed guardian ad litem); Eaton v. Karr, 251 A.2d
640 (D.C. 1969) (appointing guardian ad litem to represent the a couple's five children, and
requiring the husband to pay the costs (citing Boone v. Boone, 150 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir.
1945) (establishing that the court may appoint "experienced and disinterested persons" to
aid in the resolution of custody disputes)); Coles v. Coles, 202 A.2d 394, 395 (D.C. 1964)
(involving a guardian ad litem who was appointed to assist the court with the custody de-
termination and "to insure a tranquil atmosphere for the child during the interim period").
Appointment of a guardian ad litem or an attorney for the child is rare in custody cases
in the District of Columbia. The average cost of appointment of a guardian ad litem for a
child in a custody case would range between $2,000 to $5,000, and "in its budget estimate
the D.C. Courts admitted that these expenditures cannot be made." Letter from Deborah
Luxenberg, Esq., to John W. Hill, Jr., Executive Director, District of Columbia Financial
Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, app. 8, 6 (Feb. 8, 1996).
Only a handful of jurisdictions call for a court to appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor child in their joint custody statutes. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.310(a) (Michie 1995)
(indicating that the court may appoint a representative for the minor); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 571-46(8) (Michie Supp. 1995) (stating that a court may appoint a guardian ad litem
to represent the child, and that it may assess the reasonable fees of the guardian, in whole
or in part, to either or both parties); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(I1)(b) (1992) (stating
that a court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of a child to assist
the court in determining whether a joint legal custody award is appropriate); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2-4(c) (West 1996) (allowing a court, upon its own motion or for good cause
shown, to appoint a guardian ad litem, an attorney, or both to represent a minor child, and
granting the court the authority to award counsel fees to the guardian and/or attorney and
to assess the costs between the parties); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(B)(2)(a) (An-
derson 1996) (stating that a court, in its discretion, may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor child, and shall appoint one upon the motion of either parent).
148. The joint custody legislation as introduced on January 3, 1995 included the follow-
ing language: "Any order awarding custody of a minor child or children ... may be modi-
fied from sole custody to joint custody at any time pursuant to this subsection." Joint
Custody of Children Amendment Act of 1995, Bill 11-26, § 2(b)(6)(D), 11th Sess. (D.C.
1995).
149. See D.C. CODE § 16-914(a-2) (Supp. 1996). The statutory language avoids confu-
sion as to whether modification simply to achieve joint custody meets the standard. In fact,
§ 16-914 makes this point while failing, inadvertently it seems, to express the modification
standard itself which is set out in § 16-911(a-2)(4)(A). Section 16-911(a-2)(4)(A) states
that modification or termination of a custody order can occur only upon a showing that
there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances and that a modification
or termination is in the best interest of the child. See D.C. CODE ANN. §16-911(a-2)(4)(A)
(Supp. 1996). Section 16-911(a-2)(4)(B) places the burden of proof for modification on the
party seeking the change and sets the standard of proof as a preponderance of the evi-
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11. Not Just Divorce and Separation
Finally, the Act obliquely addresses the possibility that application of
the joint custody presumption may be limited to divorce cases. 150 It is
significant that the legislature included in both sections of the law a
phrase that is often used in connection with joint custody, "frequent and
continuing contact," and connected it to language stating that the provi-
sion applies to all relationships, "regardless of marital status."151 This is
the first time that the legislature explicitly has applied the custody stan-
dence. These provisions are no more than a codification of existing case law. See Rice v.
Rice, 415 A.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Although it does not use the language codifying the standard of review for modification
or termination of a custody order, § 16-914(a-2) makes clear that the new law does not
inherently amount to a substantial and material change in circumstances sufficient to war-
rant a modification or termination of custody. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a-2). Thus,
by implication only, the standard codified in § 16-911 is applied to § 16-914. It would have
been better to be explicit in both sections as to the standard, with a subpart specifying that
the change in law is not prima facie evidence that the standard has been met. Nonetheless,
between the case law, the language in § 16-911, and the reference in § 16-914 (a-2), the
codification of the standard for all custody orders is apparent, if not elegantly stated.
150. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-911(a)(5), 16-914(a)(2) (Supp. 1996).
151. Id. §§ 16-911(a)(5), 16-914(a)(2).
Both sections read as follows:
Unless the court determines that it is not in the best interest of the child, the court
may issue an order that provides for frequent and continuing contact between
each parent and the minor child or children and for the sharing of responsibilities
of child-rearing and encouraging the love, affection, and contact between the mi-
nor child or children and the parents regardless of marital status.
Id. (emphasis added).
The following states have provisions which mandate that the court consider "frequent
and continuing contact" as a factor in determining the best interest of the child. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(A)(6) (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. §14-10-124(1)
(1987); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602-(a)(8) (West Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 214(5)(H) (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(13) (West Supp. 1997);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(F)(2)(b) (Anderson Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-10(2) (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 665(b)(5) (1989); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.24(5)(c) (West 1993).
Other states have provisions that reflect a legislative intent to award custody in a manner
that assures that a child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents. See ALA.
CODE § 30-3-150 (Michie 1975); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060(c) (Michie 1996); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3040(a)(1) (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(a) (West Supp. 1997); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(a) (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(B)(vi) (Supp.
1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2) (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-222
(1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(3)(a) (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 112(c)(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5303(a) (West 1991); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Michie 1995).
The "regardless of marital status" language also could be viewed as an attempt to legiti-
mize the practice in the District of Columbia of co-opting for all custody matters the cus-
tody standard currently limited by statute to married couples. Such an interpretation is a
reach. Still, this is the first reference in the statute to custodial relationships that are not
related to a marriage, giving rise to the inference in the absence of more specific language,
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dard to unwed parents. While the best interest standard had been rou-
tinely applied to unwed parents, joint custody raises different issues
because it is a policy that is tied conceptually to divorce and is intended to
continue much of the unity attributed to marriage, vis-a-vis the children.
The joint custody dialogue does not contemplate unwed parents, and as.
such, it does not reflect the reality that many couples live and raise chil-
dren together without marrying.152 There is no legitimate basis for distin-
guishing between unmarried parents who are separating and parents
whose marriage is dissolving, and, in this instance, the statute appropri-
ately applies the custody options to this group of unwed parents.
There is also a large category of parents who never married, never lived
together, and never coordinated their lives, however, including the re-
sponsibilities that come with having children.153 In these situations, un-
distinguished by the statute, the court should be concerned about
requiring the parents to enter a relationship that is completely foreign.
The statute gives the court reason to be cautious in entering a joint cus-
tody order in these situations by requiring the judge to consider prior
parenting history, but it is unclear whether prior history, listed as a factor
to be considered in rebutting the presumption, will gain the distinction
warranted in these situations. 54
Recently, in Ysla v. Lopez, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
addressed the statute's application to unwed parents in the situation of a
couple who had an ongoing relationship, but often lived apart due to the
that the courts' practice of using the statute for all custody cases is consistent with the
legislature's statutory intent.
152. The 1990 Census reports that of the 122,087 families residing with their own chil-
dren in the District of Columbia, 48,575 are headed by female householders, with no hus-
band present. See CENSUS-SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 21, at
46. Married couples account for 63,110 families, and no statistic is provided for families
residing with their children headed by male householders with no wife present. See id.
The data does not specify unwed parents living with their own children. See id.
153. See WILSON, supra note 23, at 87-88.
[T]he number of children living with a single parent who has never married grew
from 243,000 in 1960 to 3.7 million in 1983, and then to 6.3 million in 1993. As of
1993, 9 percent of all children under the age of 18 were living with a never mar-
ried parent. This includes 31 percent of black children, 13 percent of Hispanic
children, and 5 percent of white children.
Id.
154. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911 (5)(C) states that the court should consider "the interac-
tion and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or parents his or her siblings,
and any other person who may emotionally or psychologically affect the child's best inter-
est" and § 16-911(5)(H) permits the court to assess "the prior involvement of each parent
in the child's life." See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-911(5)(C), 16-911(5)(H) (Supp. 1996).
Both specifically direct the court to look at the parenting history. See D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-911(5)(C), 16-911(5)(H) (Supp. 1996). The same factors appear in § 16-914(3)(C)
and (I). See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(3)(C), 16-914(3)(I) (Supp. 1996).
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father's "itinerant nature."' 55 The father, although not the primary care-
taker, was actively involved with the child.156 The case was tried prior to
the Act's passage, but the Court of Appeals referred to the new law spec-
ifying its application to unmarried parents as bolstering its conclusion
that even prior to the passage of the Act, joint custody could be awarded
to unmarried parents, "particularly in a case such as this, where both par-
ents [ ] actively participated in the upbringing of the child."' 5 7 The Court
of Appeals further observed, even in light of two significant factors, the
parents' inability to communicate and cooperate, that "no single factor
.. [was] necessarily controlling.- 158 The court was impressed, however,
by what it described as the "strong relationship" between the father and
the child. Such a relationship is often not a component of the experience
shared by unwed parents who never attempted to live and raise the child
together. 159
IV. THE IMPACT OF JOINT CUSTODY AWARDS ON FAMILIES RELYING
UPON AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN
That joint custody will provide a panacea for the woes of troubled
neighborhoods and delinquent or troubled youth has been asserted as a
positive effect of joint custody laws. 160 The expectation is that joint cus-
tody would woo back fathers, the same fathers who failed to assume any
responsibility for their children prior to court intervention, but such senti-
ment has not been linked to the studies that highlight the failings of bro-
ken families. 161 This perspective piggybacks the cynicism of racial and
155. 684 A.2d 775 (D.C. 1996).
156. Id. at 776.
157. See id. at 778.
158. See id. at 781.
159. See id. When asked if she still saw the father of her child, one woman from a poor
neighborhood on the West Side of Chicago responded: "He left before the baby was born,
I was about two weeks pregnant and he said that he didn't want to be bothered and I said
'Fine-you go your way and I go mine."' Wilson, supra note 23, at 99.
160. See Brazil, infra note 163.
161. See Twenty-Second Transcript, supra note 31, at 106-07 (statement of
Councilmember Harold Brazil). The Children's Rights Council argued in support of the
District's joint custody legislation that "regardless of the social ill under consideration,
whether it be psychological/emotional, crime, substance abuse .... poor academic achieve-
ment, suicide, or sex at an early age, the data unambiguously shows that loss of one parent
(usually the father) from active involvement in the life of the child poses a tremendous
threat to the child's well being." Letter dated December 20, 1993 to Councilmember Har-
old Brazil from Barry Hill, Esq., on behalf of the Children's Rights Council. One book
cited by Hill in support of the relationship between crime and single parent homes de-
scribed gang members as having a "stronger need than other urban inner-city youths to
distance themselves from inept or uncaring home environments." FRANCIS A.J. IANNI,
THE SEARCH FOR STRUCTURE: A REPORT ON AMERICAN YOUTH TODAY 207 (1989).
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gender-coded slurs hurled at "welfare mothers," by blaming the parent
who stuck around.
162
District of Columbia Councilmember Harold Brazil offered the follow-
ing in opposition to a substitute amendment to the joint custody
presumption:
Fathers have come-and especially black fathers have come,
with anecdotal evidence, with moving and emotional stories
about how their family was torn asunder and their efforts to try
to get it back .... We're trying to strengthen the family and
we're trying to strengthen especially the black family, which we
all know is under siege. It's particularly under siege in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, but the product of black families-of these so
oftentimes single black families, broken families-are black
males-black females, but particularly the black males, as we've
now come to know them as endangered species. So we're trying
to put that back together.
163
Many of these home environments, according to lanni, were single-parent families "where
the mother has been unable or unwilling to establish adequate behavioral controls over her
male children" or families in which a step-father was present against whom the male child
rebelled. Id. lanni studied 311 adolescents from a range of backgrounds over a period of
six years, from 1979-1985, and studied several communities during the 1970s and 1980s.
lanni focused on the need for community responses to the varied demands adolescents
face: their own physical and cognitive development, family and peers, and community envi-
ronmental settings. Id. at 260. lanni did not offer joint custody as a remedy for broken
families, or even suggest it as an option in the homes of the urban gang members he as-
sessed. William Julius Wilson observes that "children from mother-only households are
more likely to be school dropouts, to receive lower earnings in young adulthood, and to be
recipients of welfare. WILSON, supra note 23, at 92. Wilson goes on to describe the per-
ception by inner-city black women that men are not inclined to meet their responsibilities
as fathers or husbands. Id. at 98-99.
162. Cf. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 77 (1991) (noting that
the welfare mother is accused of being lazy, avoiding work, and instilling bad values in her
children). Mr. Wilson makes the following observation:
Neighborhoods plagued by high levels of joblessness are more likely to experi-
ence low levels of social organization: the two go hand in hand. High rates of
joblessness trigger other neighborhood problems that undermine social organiza-
tion, ranging from crime, gang violence, and drug trafficking to family breakups
and problems in the organization of family life.
WILSON, supra note 23, at 21. The high level of poverty in the black community "is one of
the legacies of historical racial segregation." Id at 16. Wilson's discussion of the deteriora-
tion of social organization within the black community has been criticized for providing
ammunition to those opposed to the current welfare policy because his analysis lends legiti-
macy to those who regard public assistance as a symptom of black pathology. See Adolph
Reed Jr., Dissing the Underclass, THE PROGRESSiVE, Dec. 1, 1996, at 20, 21. The truth is
that any analysis can be contorted, and while Wilson is not as political in his analysis as
some may wish, particularly in the current anti-welfare climate, he is not an apologist for
those who lay the blame for the status of blacks living in poverty at the feet of what they
label as indolent welfare mothers.
163. TWenty-Second Transcript, supra note 31, at 106-07.
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Such assertions mischaracterize black women as holding their men at
bay with the complicity of the civil justice system. Black women are not
the cause of the difficulties faced by black families, and joint custody
should not be viewed by legislators as an antidote to evils unjustly attrib-
uted to black women."6 Such views blame victims of exclusion and pov-
erty, and are both misplaced and insidious. 165 They divide and further
defeat communities that need strength, persistence, and considerable cre-
ativity to overcome their legacy. The healing will not be advanced by
scapegoating those who have shared the burden of economic and psycho-
logical abuse that, despite considerable gains, continues to play a role in
our history. Nor will policies that cling to the ideal of the nuclear family
help black communities beset by poverty, or any other group within our
society for whom such associations have failed or never formed.1
6 6
164. Cf. WILSON, supra note 23, at 87-110 (discussing the many factors which have
harmed the structure and cohesiveness of black families).
165. According to Professor Ammons, the black, single female who is the head of the
household has been blamed for the lack of black economic progress. See Ammons, supra
note 22, at 1050 n. 174. Ammons cites the Moynihan Report of the 1960s (newly dusted off
and offered to support current welfare policy despite protest from its author) for its asser-
tion that the black woman prefers a matriarchal system with the result that the black com-
munity "has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out of line with
the rest of American society, seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole." Id.
(citing OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE CASE
FOR NATIONAL ACTION-THE NEGRO FAMILY 30 (1965)).
166. Suzanne LaFont, reporting on her 1987-1991 study of families in Kingston, Ja-
maica, observed:
Where is their history of paternal responsibility of the father for their offspring?
Was it supposed to have survived 300 years of slavery? Should it have been inter-
nalized during the slave period because it is how the slave owners lived? Or was
it to have evolved in the post-emancipation era of poverty, migration and discrim-
ination .... The concept of 'father' in the Caribbean needs to be recognized by
the state for what it is and not for what it should be....
.... Promoting the nuclear family may be detrimental in terms of the way a
child can be made to feel about themselves [sic] growing up in society which tells
them children need mothers and fathers .... If a child internalizes the dominant
ideology ... that child ... will mature feeling shortchanged.
... . Social engineering is a complex process. The Jamaican example has
proved that policies and laws do not necessarily have the intended effects.
SUZANNE LAFONT, THE EMERGENCE OF AN AFRO-CARIBBEAN LEGAL TRADITION: GEN-
DER RELATIONS AND FAMILY COURTS IN KINGSTON, JAMAICA 207-09 (1995); see also
Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1995) (discussing
the need for a more positive view of the single parent family, and the economic inequities
suffered by women resulting from the elevation of the traditional nuclear family). Profes-
sor Dowd observes that:
[lI]t is ironic that the law permits many fathers to be parents in little more than
name (or genes) only, while condemning single parent families for, among other
things, the absence of a father .... Critical ... is an understanding of the actual
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There were almost seventy thousand Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) recipients in the District of Columbia in 1996.167
AFDC is a federally-funded support program, administered by states and
the District, which grants small monthly cash benefits and medical cover-
age to children who are deprived of support or child care due to a par-
ent's death, disability, or regular absence from the home. While
"continued absence" has been interpreted in recent years to allow the
absent parent to maintain greater contact with the child, no federal stat-
ute or regulation specifically addresses what impact joint custody has on
the analysis. 168 Nor are there federal court decisions on point. As it
stands, if there has been court-ordered joint custody, the AFDC parent
has the burden of proving that the contact is nonetheless insignificant.
169
Comprehensive changes in the welfare system resulting from the pas-
sage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which replaces AFDC as it has been known,
make unclear the extent to which this type of public assistance will con-
division of caregiving during marriage and after divorce .... [S]ingle parenting is
the most common pattern [with both].
Id. at 67.
167. See MAYOR'S INTERAGENCY POLICY COUNCIL AND CITIZENS WELFARE TRANS-
FORMATION COMMITTEE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WELFARE REFORM IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA App. F (Jan. 1997) [hereinafter MAYOR'S REPORT]. Of the
69,298 total D.C. recipients, 21,021 were adults and 20,206 were female single heads of
households. See id.
168. See 2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 13.07[3] (1996) (discussing the impact of joint physical custody awards on re-
ceipt of AFDC benefits, and addressing the impact of 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.). Persons
eligible to receive AFDC benefits are also eligible to receive free medical care through the
Medicaid program. Cf. Randall W. Robinson & Alan M. Wasserman, AFDC, Medicaid &
Food Stamps: Assisting Assistance Units, 35 ADVOCATE 20 (1992) (citing 42 U.S.C. Sec.
1396a(a)(10)(A)(I)(1) (1991), the Medicaid statute).
169. See Diann Dawson, Comment, The Evolution of a Federal Family Law Policy
Under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act-The Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Program, 36 CATH. U. L. REV: 197, 209 (1986). The author points out that House Bill,
H.R. 4266, 98th Cong. (1983), was introduced to require a joint custody preference as a
condition of federal funding of state AFDC programs. See id. at 212. That bill went no-
where. According to Dawson, "There is no evidence ... that adequate consideration has
been given to the potential impact joint custody laws may have on AFDC families, particu-
larly when faced with court custody proceedings initiated in the context of the federal child
support enforcement program." Id. That observation is as true today as when Dawson
made it. See generally Roger J.R. Leresqyue, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: The Problem
with the Direction of Welfare Reform, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1 (1994). Mr. Ler-
esqyue observes that Congress failed to understand that too much visitation by a noncus-
todial parent of an AFDC child could result in ineligibility because the child may no longer
qualify as deprived of parental support or care. See id. at 37. Citing California law, he
points out that some state laws preclude credit in AFDC cases for expenses incurred and
savings resulting from shared physical custody arrangements. See id. at 38.
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tinue.17 0  Instead of the federal welfare entitlements in the form of
AFDC, states and the District will receive block grants under which they
have wide discretion to fashion their own welfare programs, subject to
certain federal requirements.17' One of the benefits of the new law, and
one that must be reached to feel any sense that we as a society are meet-
ing our obligation to the poor under this welfare reform, is that states
now have the flexibility to eliminate the rule that disqualifies a family
from receiving cash assistance when there is a second parent in the house.
This has been one of the most insidious aspects of AFDC, in that fathers
who were unable to support their families were driven away so that their
families could qualify for benefits.17 The result has been to encourage a
lack of responsibility and a sense of irrelevancy for fathers. The District
of Columbia makes clear in its proposed plan that such disincentivies will
no longer apply, and that two-parent households will be encouraged.
173
170. See WILSON, supra note 23, at 169-70 (describing PRWORA); see also Alexia Pap-
pas, Note, Welfare Reform: Child Welfare or the Rhetoric of Responsibility?, 45 DUKE L.J.
1301, 1326 (1996) (concluding that the new welfare law eliminates the commitment to chil-
dren that has evolved during this century and replaces it with "a policy of national child
abandonment.").
171. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. The welfare reform law embodied in a new Title IV-A
of the Social Security Act, recently enacted by Congress and signed by the President, re-
places AFDC with a new block grant program called the Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) program. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113. Under the
new law, states must comply with certain requirements in order to receive block funding,
including the requirements that TANF parents find work within two years of being on the
rolls and that parents not exceed a maximum of five years total time in the program. See
Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 402, 408, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113, 2134. The constraints are exacer-
bated by the fact that states and the District are no longer required to provide any level of
cash benefits to their citizens living in poverty; the concept of welfare entitlement has
ended. See WILSON, supra note 23, at 170. Furthermore, states are now encouraged to
include behavioral provisions, such as ending benefits for any child born after AFDC has
been afforded to the family and requiring teens who wish to receive AFDC benefits to stay
in, or return to, their parents' home. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 408, 110 Stat. 2105, 2136.
States and the District must restructure their programs by July 1, 1997, in order to qualify
for the federal block grants. See id. § 403(a)(3)(C)(ii); MAYOR'S REPORT, supra note 167
at 38. The District is currently in the process of completing its plan for providing assist-
ance consistent with the new federal law. The Mayor's proposal for the District's program
is currently in the review process. See id at 4-6.
172. See Robinson & Wasserman, supra note 168, at 22 n.18 (discussing the fact that
under the continued absence requirement, daily visitation almost always negates the requi-
site finding, and arguing that frequent visitation should not preclude eligibility for AFDC
benefits because the continued absence requirement shouldn't "serve to interfere with an
absent parent's relationship with his or her child"). The national Governors Association
listed supporting intact families by eliminating welfare rules that penalize two parent fami-
lies as one of its six goals for welfare reform. Kim Cobb, How Fares Welfare?; States Re-
form as Congress Debates and Every Step Breeds Controversy, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Dec. 18, 1994, at Al.
173. See MAYOR'S REPORT, supra note 167, at 74-75.
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The District's proposed plan does not refer to households in which cus-
tody, including joint custody, is an issue.174 Presumably, under the block
grant, the District will have greater flexibility in establishing how joint
custody will be accommodated. It may resort to the significant contact
analysis employed under AFDC, 175 at least for purposes of determining
which household should receive assistance. a76 In that event, the District
can get some guidance in approaching this issue by looking to what other
jurisdictions have done to maintain AFDC benefits in joint custody situa-
tions. Ohio, for example, provides by statute that the court awarding
joint custody may decide the child's primary residence if necessary to
qualify for AFDC purposes. 177 While some state agencies have enacted
policies, many state agencies address the matter on a case-by-case ba-
sis. 178 Where both parents have equal physical custody, for example,
agencies have been known to distribute benefits to the first parent who
applies. It appears, however, that the benefits have never been split be-
tween joint physical custody households.1 79 Thus, it is not clear what
course the District will take, particularly where joint physical custody
174. See id.
175. 42 U.S.C.A. § 606(a) (AFDC definition of "dependent child" for purposes of qual-
ifying for benefits under the program which definition includes deprivation of parental care
by reason of "continued absence").
176. A joint custody arrangement should identify a child's primary home and designate
one parent as the primary custodian in order to meet the absent parent requirement. See
Robinson & Wasserman, supra note 168, at 20.
177. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(A)(2) (Anderson 1996). There are five
other jurisdictions which make reference to AFDC in their joint custody statutes as well.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(L) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that the court may
specify one party as the minor child's primary caretaker and one home as the minor child's
primary home for purposes of defining eligibility for public assistance, but'that this finding
does not diminish the rights.of either party, nor create a presumption for or against either
party in a custody modification proceeding); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3086 (Deering 1994) (de-
lineating that a court may specify one parent as the child's primary caretaker and that one
home will be the child's primary home to aid in determining eligibility for public assist-
ance); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112(E) (West Supp. 1997) (stating that in custody, sup-
port, or enforcement cases, the court shall inquire whether public assistance money was
provided by the Department of Health Services for the minor child's benefit and, if it has,
the DHS shall be a necessary party for the adjudication and establishment of the debt
owed); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (D)(1) (Supp. 1995) (requiring that a parties' receipt of
public assistance not be a factor in awarding custody); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2(4)
(1995). The Utah statute requires the court to inform parties that
[a]n order for joint custody may preclude eligibility for public assistance in the
form of aid to families with dependent children, and that if public assistance is
required for the support of children of the parties at any time subsequent to an
order of joint legal custody, the order may be terminated.
Id.
178. See Conversation with Steve Cesar, Acting Chief, Federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Policy Branch Department of Health and Human Services, February 7, 1996.
179. See id.
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awards provide a roughly even split. Benefits may be granted to the first
custodian who seeks them, with support contributions required of the
other parent. As a result, this other parent may not be able to provide for
the child while in his or her custody. In addition, attempting to split the
benefits for the children will not provide a solution since AFDC is mea-
ger at best and cannot begin to accommodate the redundancies needed
for dual homes. Furthermore, the benefits available under PRWORA
will not be any greater.
Joint legal custody should not raise the same problems with regard to
distribution of benefits. Although it may raise a significant contact issue,
once that hurdle is overcome, the benefits would be collected by the par-
ent having physical custody. This may lead, however, to a preference for
granting only joint legal custody in the case of indigent parents, particu-
larly given the statutory admonition to consider the impact upon AFDC
benefits. 180  Such a practice in turn, may raise due process questions
since the custodial arrangements available to families living in poverty
would be limited by virtue of their status. 81 Nevertheless, the alternative
of no access to this type of public benefit in one of their dwellings under a
joint physical custody arrangement makes the lives of children living in
poverty even more tenuous.
V. JOINT CUSTODY SHOULD NOT BE PRESUMED OR IMPOSED
A joint custody presumption is attractive because it seeks to recon-
struct, or construct, the Ozzie and Harriet ideal of the nuclear family out
of a relationship that has failed, or in many cases never existed.
182
Neither reason nor social science support such high regard.
8 3
All too often in this area of law, legislatures swing from one preference
to another without requiring solid evidence in support of the approach
considered. The maternal preference, for example, reinforces the notion
180. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§16-911(a)(5)(O), 16-914(a)(3)(P) (1981 & Supp. 1996)
(listing impact on Aid to Families with Dependent Children and medical assistance as fac-
tors to consider in determining the best interest of the child and in rebutting the presump-
tion in favor of joint custody).
181. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (finding that Fourteenth
Amendment due process protections are implicated if consideration of the rights of a par-
ent to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her child is denied
based upon a determination of indigent status, and holding that an illegitimate child could
not become a ward of the state without a hearing on the parental fitness of the biological
father).
182. See Stephen B. Reed, The Demise of Ozzie and Harriet: Effective Punishment of
Domestic Abusers, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 337 (1991) (illustrating
the dangers inherent in creating policy based on idyllic perceptions of the nuclear family).
183. See supra notes 66 and 84.
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that mothers are responsible for children while fathers are not.184 Joint
legal or physical custody, on the other hand, forces mothers who in fact
have been responsible for the children to make concessions in order to
continue to raise them.185 Joint legal custody reinforces the notion that
fathers have a decision-making, as opposed to a caretaking, role in the
family. Although most statutes do not indicate a preference for the form
of joint custody awarded, currently most orders award joint legal cus-
tody. 186 Seven jurisdictions have statutes that specifically favor joint legal
custody. 187 In these jurisdictions one parent has the bulk of the responsi-
bility for providing the day to day nurturing of the children and Imust
negotiate with the absent parent with regard to decision-making. In es-
sence, the absent parent has the benefit of wielding authority without un-
dertaking the responsibility for its execution. This imbalance not only is
unfair to the physical custodian, but can undermine that parent's role in
child rearing since decisions are subject to negotiation with a parent who
is not otherwise functioning in the daily life of the family.
188
184. Sylvia Law and Patricia Hennessey make this very point and go on to observe that
when fathers sought to overcome the maternal preference, it was defeated on "[tihe flimsi-
est and most sex-biased showing of maternal 'unfitness."' Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hen-
nessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of Family Law, 69 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 345, 348
(1993). The authors make the following observation about joint custody:
When courts or legislatures do address the principles for adjudicating child cus-
tody disputes, they often act without close attention to factual complexity, empiri-
cal evidence, or respect for generally prevailing principles of lawmaking .... [An]
example of thoughtless action in the custody area occurred in the 1980s when
several jurisdictions adopted a strong preference for joint custody . . . . [T~he
presumption for joint custody was adopted without careful attention to empirical
evidence or diversity of factual situations .... Joint custody adversely impacts on
women because it diminishes their bargaining power and forces them to make
financial concessions in order to avoid it.
Id. at 352-53 (footnotes omitted).
185. See id.; see also Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody
and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168, 177-78 (demonstrating how men
can use joint custody as a bargaining chip against their wives in divorce proceedings).
186. See supra note 27 (discussing joint legal custody).
187. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123.5 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 727 (1993);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(f) (Michie Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1(3) (West
1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 subd. 2 (West Supp. 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:17(11) (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-10.1, 30-3-10.2 (1995).
188. Singer and Reynolds describe the parenting problems and inequity that joint phys-
ical custody creates:
[T]he vast majority of court-ordered joint custody decrees provide for equal pa-
rental rights, but impose vastly unequal parental responsibilities.
Joint legal custody thus severely restricts the ability of the parent with whom
the child lives to make significant decisions affecting both her life and the lives of
her children. In essence, it gives the nonresidential father veto power over most
major decisions regarding the health, education, and upbringing of children who
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A jurisdiction like the District of Columbia, where single parenthood
and poverty are prevalent,189 should be concerned about whether struc-
tural changes in its custody laws will undermine the ability of the single
parent to persevere. Joint custody does not guarantee that the absent
parent will miraculously arrive on the scene and share in responsibilities
previously shunned. What it does do is give the absent parent an opening
to undermine the status of the parent who is functioning in that role. In
one of my cases, the mother kept trying to establish some time, any time,
that the father would spend with their son. The father, who was ex-
tremely critical of the care provided by the mother and insisted on his
right to set down certain rules, consistently refused to make any arrange-
ment to even visit the child. His availability, he maintained, would de-
pend on what kind of work he could get. The mother observed that he
had consistently been unemployed for years, and thus this contingency
consumed any possibility of contact with the child.
Judge Mack, writing for the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Bazemore v. Davis, had this to say about imposing a maternal presump-
tion in child custody cases:
McCormick, in his treatise on evidence, suggests that there
are four principle reasons for the creation of presumptions.
First, some presumptions are created to correct an imbalance
resulting from a party's superior access to the proof. Second,
notions, usually implicit rather than expressed, of social and eco-
nomic policy, incline the courts to favor one contention by giv-
ing it the benefit of a presumption, and correspondingly to
handicap the disfavored adversary. Third, a presumption may
be created to avoid an impasse, to reach some result, even
though it is an arbitrary one. Lastly, a presumption may be
based on a judicial belief that proof of some fact renders the
inference of the existence of another fact so probable that it is
are not in his physical care .... To subject a nonconsenting physical custodian to
such an arrangement ... invites chaos and offends well-established principles of
parental autonomy ....
[Jloint legal custody affords a nonresidential parent many privileges and a sig-
nificant measure of control over his former spouse, but few parental obligations
or responsibilities.
Singer & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 503-05 (footnote omitted).
189. Single-parent households are now the majority in the District. See GEORGE
GRIER, GREATER WASHINGTON RESEARCH CENTER, SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES: A FIRST
LOOK BASED ON 1990 CENSUS DATA 7-8 (Aug. 1992). Ninety percent of the single-parent
families are African American and 89% of the single-parents are female. See id. The




sensible and time-saving to assume the truth of the other fact
until the adversary disproves it.
The first rationale.., would not justify a presumption here, as
both parents have access to proof concerning their child's best
interests.
Nor do the second, third or fourth reasons survive close scru-
tiny ... for they would be either arbitrary, or based on unwar-
ranted assumptions....
.... [T]he presumption facilitates error in an arena in which
there is little room for error .... A norm is ill-suited for deter-
mining the future of a unique being whose adjustment is vital to
the welfare of future generations. Surely, it is not asking too
much to demand that a court, in making a determination as to
the best interest of a child, make a determination upon specific
evidence related to that child alone. 190
The analysis is just as persuasive when applied to joint custody.
The best interest of the child standard as applied, however, is not be-
yond reproach, particularly in the context of unwed, single parents living
in poverty. This category of litigant violates just about every aspect of the
traditional, middle-class family ideal, and that ideal is the premise from
which most judges begin their analysis of what is best for the child.
Judges and others who apply the best interest standard inevitably incor-
porate personal prejudices that reflect those held by society at large. 191
For example, effort is made to encourage co-parenting even when parents
are demonstrably antagonistic;1 92 women are resented and mistrusted,
even as they are expected to epitomize the good parent; 193 black women
are particularly vilified; 194 men are viewed as discriminated against in the
190. Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377, 1381-83 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citations omitted).
191. David Chambers observes that "[w]henever the word 'best' is used, one must al-
ways ask 'according to whom?"' Chambers, supra note 66, at 488.
192. Joint custody "assumes that [the parents] will make decisions as though the mar-
riage were not dissolved.... It seems to make little sense to adopt a relationship that can
be so easily disrupted." Gary N. Skoloff, Joint Custody: A Jaundiced View-Calling Solo-
mon's Bluff, TRIAL, Mar. 1984, at 52, 54.
193. See Zorza, supra note 68, at 923 (regarding discrimination against women).
194. Black women who are professionals are not immune to the stereotyping that
makes the lives of blacks living in poverty seem so hopeless. Professor Patricia Williams
speaks of taxi cab drivers refusing to stop for her and her physician husband, stores that
assume she is there to shoplift, and cashiers flinging change on the counters. See Jennifer
M. Russell, Nothing to Be Ashamed Of, ESSENCE, Aug. 1991, at 140; see also Ammons,
supra note 22, at 1053 n.179 (citing the Russell article and discussing further policies that
discouraged blacks from obtaining memberships at a health spa chain). It is difficult to
find "security" in distinctions based on class in a society that has such a solid foundation in
racial prejudice.
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custody process or as needed to offset the negative impact of being raised
by a single mother, thus resulting in an effort to encourage the father's
participation in child rearing.195 Judges reflect these perceptions and
their constant modulation as attitudes change. In short, the best interest
of the child standard is inherently broad and adaptable, and, as such, is
ripe for abuse.
196
Presumptions and preferences can give guidance to judges who are un-
derstandably under siege due to the volume of custody cases and the de-
tail needed to evaluate each under the best interest of the child
standard.197 They can also ameliorate the concerns about abuse of judi-
cial discretion. Although any presumption cries out for the exception in
an area as idiosyncratic, and, as Judge Mack points out,198 as important
custody law, the benefits of limiting judicial discretion can outweigh the
disadvantages, provided the standard adopted relates directly to the
child's welfare and is not applied by rote.1 99 The primary caretaker pre-
sumption most accurately meets the objective of giving courts some gui-
dance in applying the best interest of the child standard with a minimum
195. "In the vast majority of cases, the fathers do not want custody and the children
remain with the mother by parental choice. When fathers do want custody, their chances
of winning are substantial." Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis
of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 2, 3 (1982).
196. See Janet L. Dolgin, Why Has the Best Interest Standard Survived?: The Historic
and Social Context, 16 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J. 2 (1996). Professor Dolgin argues that
the best interest of the child standard is flawed, but has survived because of its ability to
"sustain the illusion that the moral essence of old-fashioned, traditional families can be
preserved even as those families are changing under the pressures of modernity." Id. at 8;
see also Chambers, supra note 66, at 487-99; Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia,
Contradiction and the New Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473,484-86 (1996).
197. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 66, at 484-96 (evaluating joint custody's accuracy
as a legal decision principal, measured by the extent to which it efficiently reflects the law's
policy objective, and concluding that while its decision costs are lower it does not accu-
rately reflect the best interest of the child standard).
198. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
199. Professor Jane Murphy states:
[I]n the area of custody, replacing multifactor, highly discretionary standards with
rules such as the primary caretaker presumption would foster more decisions that
ultimately serve the best interests of the children of divorce. Advocates of the
primary caretaker rule argue that it advances the virtues of certainty and predict-
ability while furthering the goal of producing decisions in the best interests of the
child. In applying the primary caretaker rule, decisionmakers must look to past
behavior rather than attempt to predict future behavior.
Murphy, supra note 119, at 226 (footnote omitted). Professor Karen Czapanskiy argues
that "predictable rule-based regimes" can ameliorate the impact of gender-based discrimi-
nation, but she cautions if we go too far toward standardization we may be unable to give
sufficient weight to the "context in which particular parties operate." Karen I. Czapanskiy,
Domestic Violence, The Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gen-
der Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 273 (1993).
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of error. Such a presumption has the benefit of rewarding the parent who
has been most consistently and directly involved in child rearing, while
assuming that the child will continue to reap the benefits of such effort.2 °°
Joan Kelly, writing for the Center for the Future of Children, argues that
the most serious problem with the primary caretaker standard is that it
ignores the quality of the relationship between the child and caretaker in
favor of "counting hours and rewarding many repetitive behaviors.",
20 1
Why psychological adjustment and other factors mentioned by Kelly
20 2
would not be considered under the primary caretaker standard is not
clear. The focus should be on the quality of care that is provided, but the
logical place to look for that quality is in the relationship between the
child and the parent who most consistently has been the caregiver. Evi-
dence that this relationship is not the most beneficial one should rebut
the presumption.
Unlike the joint custody presumption, the primary caretaker presump-
tion does not rely on aspirations regarding the behavior of parents that
courts are not equipped to make operational. It should not be so difficult
for the law to acknowledge that children need clarity, consistency, and
nurturing, and this comes most reliably from the parents who have a rec-
ord of providing it.20 3 Joint custody often leaves the issue of structure
continually on the table, with location or decision-making constantly in
flux. By giving priority to the child care relationships that existed prior to
separation, a primary caregiver presumption avoids forcing new, tenuous
arrangements upon all involved.
200. I use "parent" advisedly in the context of a primary caretaker standard. While
babysitters, other relatives, or family friends may establish greater caretaking relationships
than either parent in some circumstances, we are not at a point in our sense of communal
responsibility for child rearing where stigma will not attach to being removed from the care
of either parent. For all the failings that I have identified with regard to imposing joint
custody, the ideal underlying the standard is that children expect to be in the custody of
either or both parents. The primary caretaker standard should be approached consistent
with the family law precept that parents are the contenders for custody unless they are
shown to be unfit.
201. Kelly, supra note 11, at 130. The author adds:
Indeed, the most important emotional and interactive behaviors promoting chil-
dren's development and psychological, social, and academic adjustment, such as
love, acceptance, respect, encouragement of autonomy, learning, and self-esteem,
moral guidance, and absence of abusive interactions, are not considered.
Id.
202. See id.
203. Clearly, in those circumstances where both parents meet the standard, the pre-
sumption would not apply. See Polikoff, supra note 13, at 243 (describing the primary
caretaker presumption as a sex-neutral standard that values nurturing and care). Polikoff
concludes that men who are angered at the possibility of losing custody under such a stan-
dard should change their approach to parenting, and not seek to change the law. See id.
1997]
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While a primary caretaker presumption is more rationally related to
the best interest standard, it is no more than a substitute for the careful
analysis a judge is expected to provide in the difficult context of the cus-
tody case. When parents' lives are disconnected or never were con-
nected, the court determining custody must make a choice as to whom it
has the greatest responsibility to protect in the process of allocating rights
and responsibilities. A presumption cast in terms of which parent gets to
do what further distracts the court from the person who it has tradition-
ally been obligated to protect-the child. Acknowledging that a joint
custody presumption is unwise does not mean that children do not need
nurturing from both parents. It simply reflects the deduction that if a co-
parenting relationship did not exist prior to separation, or has been sev-
ered as a result of parental conflict, the court is not likely to create or re-
establish it by edict.
The hope alluded to by D.C. Councilmember Brazil, that joint custody
will reconnect fathers to their families, can be achieved more accurately
by addressing poverty and the resulting pressures on family unity. In the
area of custody law, designating visitation as an obligation, as well as a
right, speaks more directly to the issue of involving fathers in the lives of
their children. This would give more incentive to parents to be consistent
in asserting and developing their child rearing role, rather than conferring
a demanding relationship intended to foster such interaction even where
it never existed. While it is difficult to envision forcing parents to spend
time with their children, courts could go further than they do to enforce
the best interest of the child standard by imposing consequences for fail-
ure to visit. At present, a non-custodial parent who fails to show up nine
out of ten times is apt to bring a contempt motion for the few occasions in
which the child was not waiting at home when the visiting parent finally
appeared. In one of my cases, the mother was constantly waiting and
trying to explain to her daughter why the father, who rarely appeared for
visitation, had not come. She developed avoidance strategies, such as not
getting her daughter dressed for the scheduled outing, to avoid the child's
sense of disappointment. The mother also shortened the time that they
would wait at home for his arrival. The father nonetheless filed a motion
to enlarge visitation, citing foiled efforts to visit his daughter. He lost his
motion and as a result of his record, the father must call the day prior if
he intends to exercise his visitation rights. While much has been made of
the potential for joint custody to give parents more of a stake in child
rearing, parents who so resent or covet the custodial authority of their
counterparts that they subject their children to disappointment and rejec-
tion are not good candidates for increased responsibility.
[Vol. 46:767
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Joint custody should certainly be available to parents who freely com-
mit to co-parenting. Such commitment has the potential to overcome
economic and social barriers that may otherwise defeat it. Too much is at
stake, however, to embark on this particular variety of social engineering
without both parents being vested in its success.
VI. CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia is a city in which the largest segment of its
population does not fit neatly within the dialogue on joint custody, which
has been driven primarily by white, upper- and middle-class parents. The
aspirations and hostilities expressed in the context of this dialogue are
ones that the black community buys into at a far greater cost. Allusions
to the failings of welfare mothers by city legislators create despair where
exceptional fortitude is needed, particularly in increasingly difficult times.
While family models in which both parents play a significant role can be
desirable, they will not be achieved by blaming the parent who shoulders
the family burden in the face of economic and social pressures that make
that role particularly hard to execute.
Most families in the District of Columbia, from all economic and social
classes, resolve custody issues by agreement. That agreement generally
represents the best hope for addressing the needs of children since the
court is not likely to force two unwilling parents into an alternative ar-
rangement. Furthermore, such agreements reflect an exercise of parental
responsibility that courts are, and should be, loath to second guess. The
role of the court in consent situations should be to determine that the
agreement was entered freely and that the children involved enjoy a level
of shelter and financial support consistent with their parents' financial
status. These, however, are not the situations addressed by a presump-
tion in favor of joint custody. The presumption comes into play in the
face of conflict between the parents as to what custody arrangement is
best. Parental rights aside, this suggests dysfunction, and society has an
interest, represented by the concept of parens patriae, in ensuring that the
children do not suffer in the exchange. A joint custody presumption is a
seemingly tidy response to the discomfort of choosing between the per-
ceived wishes and needs of two parents battling for the right to raise their
child. It says, "Both of you should do this together, and since we know
that this solution is far from tidy in the details, you propose a plan indi-
cating what it should mean."
Financial, organizational, and emotional stresses directly related to
orchestrating joint custody anticipate commitment and resources. It is
shortsighted to presume that poor families have the resources and that
19971
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broken families possess the commitment. In fact, requiring collaboration
can perpetuate abusive relationships, even under a statute such as the
District's that specifically exempts cases in which there is a history of do-
mestic violence, child abuse and neglect, or parental kidnapping. The
language does not reach emotionally abusive relationships, and may not
reach poorly documented abusive situations that do not fit within the
statute. In such situations, joint custody can defeat the salvation sought
by parent and child through a separation.
That is why, despite the joint custody presumption, the requirement in
the District's new statute that the best interest of the child standard has
priority must not be lost in the excitement over this brand new spin. The
change should not be viewed as radical: the court is still called upon to
evaluate custody arrangements in relation to the best interest of the child.
Embarking on that assessment should rarely, at least in contested cases,
escape the difficult analysis of what will indeed be the best custodial ar-
rangement. Even without statutory imprimaturs, courts have this respon-
sibility in their role as protectors of the children. The beauty of the best
interest of the child standard is that it allows courts the flexibility to as-
sess an infinite variety of parental relationships and seek the best result
under each set of circumstances presented. That courts have not always
used this discretion wisely has been its failing.
Thus, the search for an alternative to the best interest of the child stan-
dard is understandable. The premise of the standard is irrefutable, but its
application is vague and inherently biased. It has been criticized as being
[Vol. 46:767
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unfair to fathers204 and to mothers alike. 2°5 An emphasis on the primary
caretaker can mitigate these failings in that it focuses on care of the child.
It forces an analysis of child care, and, as such, may force the court and
the litigants to bring children out of the shadows. If it is not interpreted
as a mechanical checklist of daily child maintenance, 0 6 it has the benefit
of rewarding nurture in its most affirmative sense. This does not mean
that the court should be relieved of analysis of what is in fact best for the
child, or that the goal of encouraging the involvement of both parents
should be abandoned. Participation in the raising of children can be a
matter of ego, tied directly to the need to love, to be loved, to role identi-
fication, and to deeply held beliefs regarding fundamental rights. These
are highly emotional and deeply essential feelings that are implicated
when parents struggle to capture their relationship with their children.
However, these feelings can be accommodated without creating con-
torted and tenuous arrangements that may simultaneously reward the un-
committed parent and undermine the one who is committed. As
204. Fathers' rights organizations take the position that custody awards under a best
interest of the child standard are inherently inequitable because the application of this
standard tends to favor the mother. Courts, it is argued, are unable or unwilling, without
more, to recognize the importance of fathers in the child rearing equation. Some of the
rhetoric has been quite speculative. For example, David Popenoe observes:
We know that fathers have a surprising impact on children. Fathers' involvement
seems to be linked to improved quantitative and verbal skills, improved problem-
solving ability and higher academic achievement .... How fathers produce these
intellectual benefits is not yet clear. No doubt it is partly a matter of the time and
money a man brings to his family.
David Popenoe, Where's Papa?, UTNE READER, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 71. Mr. Popenoe re-
fers to an array of studies that support this and similar assertions that extol the superiority
of the male caregiver. See id. at 68-106. Rationality lies somewhere between his findings
and the Utah Supreme Court's ruling that a father's attack on the statutory maternal pre-
sumption "might have some merit ... if the father was equally gifted in lactation as is the
mother." Arends v. Arends, 517 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 1974). The political middle ground
for some, and the beacon of fairness for others, has been joint custody. It is a seductive
concept: both parents have a right, indeed an obligation to continue to rear their children.
What is disturbing is the desire to impose such an assumption instead of regarding what the
history of care has been in each case. See generally R.F. DOYLE, THE RAPE OF THE MALE
(1976); MAURICE R. FRANKS, WINNING CUSTODY (1983); Uviller, supra note 10.
205. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Inter-
ests of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody Prefer-
ences, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1985); Uviller, supra note 10 at 129-30 (asserting that
the maternal preference should apply since any other approach, including the best interest
of the child, fails to take into account that men do not assume equal responsibility during
marriage, and that very fact disadvantages women). This is true, Ms. Uviller argues, even
in families where women work since men are treated better than women in the workplace
and women are discriminated against due largely to assumptions about their child rearing
responsibilities. See id.
206. See Kelly, supra note 11 (noting the lack of attention paid to the quality of the
parent-child relationship in the primary caretaker standard).
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important as parents' interests and feelings may be, it is a mistake to al-
low them to trump the best solution for the child. The court must balance
the competing interests of the parents with those of their children, and
given the relative vulnerability of the latter class, the court must protect
them. The court's role is to think carefully, guided primarily by the pro-
tection of the child's, not the parents' interests or ill-conceived notions of
social engineering about the implications of decisions as to where, with
whom, and under whose tutorship children in each case before the court
will spend their lives. Joint custody may be an appropriate result, but
there are far too many negative implications attached to the District of
Columbia's current presumption that it is the appropriate result.
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MODEL CUSTODY LANGUAGE FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
The District of Columbia needs a custody law that does not set an ob-
tuse standard in a legislative construct reminiscent of London Bridge.
What follows is a legislative proposal that creates a simpler statute, and,
while it includes joint custody, it emphasizes maintaining the status quo
with regard to caretaking while encouraging an assessment of what best
addresses the need of the child.
Section 2, Title 16 of the District of Columbia Code is amended as
follows:
(a) § 16-911(a)(1) is amended by inserting in the second line after the
"and" and prior to "their minor children" the following:
"child support as set forth in § 16-916.1 for"
(b) § 16-911(a)(5) is amended to read as follows:
"(5) determine who shall have the care and custody of a minor child or
children pending the proceedings consistent with the standard set forth in
§ 16-4503A."
(c) § 16-912 is amended to read as follows:
" § 16-912. Permanent custody, alimony; enforcement.
When a divorce is granted to either spouse, the court may decree him
or her permanent alimony sufficient for his or her support and, where
appropriate, shall award permanent custody of the parties' minor chil-
dren to either or both spouses as set forth in § 16-4503A and shall pro-
vide for support of the minor children as set forth in § 16-916.1, and shall
secure and enforce the payment of such alimony and child support as set
forth in § 16-911, § 16-916, and § 30-301 et seq."
(d) § 16-914 is amended to read as follows:
"§ 16-914. Retention of jurisdiction as to alimony and custody of
children.
After issuance of a decree of divorce granting alimony and providing
for the care and custody of children, the case shall still be considered
open for any future orders relating to those matters."
(e) The first paragraph § 16-916.1(n) is amended to read as follows:
"In a case in which shared custody is ordered or agreed to and the child
spends 40% or more of the child's time with each parent, the following
procedure shall be followed:"
(f) A new section, § 16-4503A is added to read as follows:
"(a) The court shall determine who shall have the care and custody of
a minor child or children without conclusive regard to the race, color,
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national origin, political affiliation, financial status, sex, or sexual orienta-
tion of a party according to procedures set forth in this section.
(b) The best interest of the child shall be the basis for determining the
care and custody of minor children.
(c) In determining the best interest of the child, the court shall con-
sider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
(1) which parent has attended most consistently to the emotional and
developmental needs of the child;
(2) the wishes of the child or to his or her custodian, where practicable;
(3) the wishes of the child's parent or parents;
(4) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her
parent or parents, his or her siblings, and any other person who may emo-
tionally or psychologically affect the child's best interest;
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(6) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school, and community;
(7) the potential disruption of the child's social and school life;
(8) the geographical proximity of the parental homes as this relates to
the practical consideration of the child's or children's residential
schedule;
(9) the demands of parental employment;
(10) the sincerity of each parent's request;
(11) the impact on public benefits and medical assistance.
(d) For the purposes of this section,
(1) If the judicial officer finds by a preponderance of evidence that a
contestant for custody has committed an intrafamily offense, any determi-
nation that custody or visitation is to be granted to the abusive parent
shall be supported by a written statement by the judicial officer specifying
factors and findings which support that determination; and
(2) In determining visitation arrangements, if the judicial officer finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that an intra family offense has oc-
curred, the judicial officer shall only award visitation if the judicial officer
finds that the child and custodial parent can be adequately protected
from harm inflicted by the other party. The party found to have commit-
ted an intra-family offense has the burden of proving that visitation will
not endanger the child or significantly impair the child's emotional
development.
(e) Joint sole and/or joint legal custody may only be granted upon the
express agreement of both parties. The court shall make findings that
indicate that both parties agree to the terms of such an order.
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(1) If the court contemplates entering a joint legal and/or joint physical
custody order, it may order each parent to submit a detailed parenting
plan delineating each parent's position with respect to the scheduling and
allocation of rights and responsibilities that will best serve the interest of
the minor child or children. The parenting plan may include, but shall not
be limited to, provisions for:
(i) the residence of the child or children;
(ii) visitation when the child is not residing with the other custodian;
(iii) holidays, birthdays, and vacation visitation;
(iv) transportation of the child or children between the residences;
(v) education
(vi) religious training, if any;
(vii) access to the child's or children's educational, medical, psychiat-
ric, and dental care records;
(viii) the parent who will make the decisions that need immediate at-
tention concerning the health, safety, and welfare of the child;
(ix) structuring decisionmaking in situations not covered in the preced-
ing subparagraph;
(x) communication between the child and the parents; and
(xi) resolving conflict through a recognized family counseling or medi-
ation service before application to the court to resolve such conflict.
(2) No joint custody order will be entered unless the court designates
the parent who will make the decisions that require immediate attention
concerning the health, safety, and welfare of the child.
(f) Visitation or co-parenting obligations shall be terminated if a pat-
tern of failing to meet such obligations is proven by a preponderance of
the evidence, unless the absent parent can offer good cause to believe
that such omissions were the result of circumstances beyond the parent's
control.
(g)(1) An award of custody may be modified or terminated upon the
motion of one or both parents, or on the court's own motion, upon a
determination that there has been a substantial and material change in
circumstances and that such modification or termination is in the best
interest of the child.
(2) When a motion to modify custody is filed, the burden of proof as to
substantial and material change in circumstances is on the party seeking a
change, and the standard of proof shall be by a preponderance of the
evidence.
(h) The court, for good cause or upon its own motion, may appoint a
guardian ad litem or an attorney or both to represent the minor child's or
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children's interests. Once this burden is met, both parents share equally
the burden of demonstrating what result is in the best interest of the
child.
(i) The court shall enter an order for any custody arrangement that is
agreed to by both parents unless there is reason to believe that such ar-
rangement is contrary to the best interest of the child or children.
(j) The provisions of this act shall apply to pleadings filed after the
date of enactment."
